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I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most interesting issue in recent constitutional
law jurisprudence is the movement toward enhancement of indi-
vidual liberties by state courts' independent interpretation of
state constitutional provisions.' This movement has developed
because of the United States Supreme Court's recent retreat
from the zealous concern for civil liberties exhibited by the War-
ren Court. In the narrower context of church-state relationships,
the Court now evinces a more equivocal attitude than ever
before.
The Washington State Supreme Court has reworked consti-
tutional exegesis in several areas.2 At least one such attempt has
been severely criticized: "The majority's decision to embrace
independent state grounds . . . is unfortunate . . . . This is the
type of decision making that has quite justifiably 'resulted in
charges that state courts are evading Supreme Court doctrine
* Professor of Law, Gonzaga University School of Law. A.B., Gonzaga University,
1948; M.A., Gonzaga University, 1950; S.T.L., Alma College, 1956; LL.B., Georgetown
University Law Center, 1961; LL.M., Yale Law School, 1962; J.S.D., Yale Law School,
1963.
** Associate Professor of Law, Gonzaga University School of Law. B.A., Washington
State University, 1969; J.D., University of Washington, 1972.
1. See, e.g., Rebirth of Reliance on State Charters, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 12, 1984, at 25-
32. This series of articles, prepared and edited by Ronald K. L. Collins, contains a com-
prehensive survey of state appellate cases interpreting state constitutional provisions in
24 subject areas. Id. at 29-30. It also surveys the law review literature on the issue. Id. at
31-32.
2. See, e.g., Southwest Wash. Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce
County, 100 Wash. 2d 109, 126-27, 667 P.2d 1092, 1102 (1983) (equal protection); State v.
White, 97 Wash. 2d 92, 104-05, 640 P.2d 1061, 1068 (1982) (application of exclusionary
rule to illegally obtained confession); MacLean v. First N.W. Indus. of America, 96
Wash. 2d 338, 346-48, 635 P.2d 683, 687-88 (1981) (law against discrimination); State v.
Fain, 94 Wash. 2d 387, 395-97, 617 P.2d 720, 725 (1980) (cruel and unusual punishment
clause); Lundgren v. Whitney's, Inc., 94 Wash. 2d 91, 96, 614 P.2d 1272, 1274 (1980)
(equal protection clause).
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and engaging in unprincipled, result-oriented use of their state
constitutions.' ,3
Despite such criticism, the Washington court seems to relish
using the state constitution to break ground on civil liberties
issues. For example, the court has accorded significantly more
protection to detained persons whose automobiles are searched
than is offered by the fourth amendment.' In so doing, the court
is creating a gap between the nationalizing influence of federal
constitutional law and state treatment of similar issues. This gap
may continue to grow, at least until the next election-or the
one after that-limited only by judicial self-restraint and the
spectre of a collision between enhanced state liberties of one
group and recognized federal liberties of another. With regard to
religious liberty and the prohibition of the state's encourage-
ment of religion, there is strong constitutional5 and case law sup-
port' for enhanced protection of individual interests that pre-
dates and presages this "new" state constitutional law.
Given recent signs of a relaxation in viewpoint by the
United States Supreme Court towards the establishment clause,7
interested groups in this state will likely exert pressure to bring
assistance-to-religion issues into public law. Inevitably, the
Washington court will be asked to re-examine the state constitu-
tion to determine whether the court's adherence to an indepen-
dent, strict "anti-establishment" position should be maintained
or even strengthened.
This Article traces the independent development in the case
law interpreting the Washington Constitution and in the draft-
ing of the document itself. It is the position of the authors that
the strict approach and consequent rigorous, independent analy-
sis by the Washington court is not a necessary or appropriate
3. State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 201-02, 622 P.2d 1199, 1218 (1980) (Horowitz,
J., dissenting) (application of exclusionary rule to warrantless search).
4. See, e.g., State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 702, 674 P.2d 1240, 1249 (1983)
(insufficient circumstances to permit a warrantless search of defendant's car).
5. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11 (1889, amended 1904, 1957) (religious freedom); art. IX,
§ 4 (sectarian control or influence prohibited). Article I, § 11 has been amended twice.
Amendment 4 (1904) added a provision allowing for employment of chaplains at state
prisons. Amendment 34 (1957) added custodial and mental institutions to the chaplain
provision.
6. See infra notes 8-35 and accompanying text.
7. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984) (city's display of nativity scene held not
violative of establishment clause); Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983) (state leg-
islature's practice of opening session with prayer by a chaplain paid by state held not
violative of establishment clause of the first amendment).
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method of deciding church-state issues, at least in many con-
texts. When examining establishment clause issues under the
state constitution, the Washington State Supreme Court should
therefore modify its previous position and adopt a more com-
mon-sense approach in lieu of the doctrinaire rigidity that has
characterized prior opinions.
II. THE ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT CASES IN WASHINGTON
One particularly strong statement appears in the Washing-
ton cases regarding use of public funds that benefit schools
under sectarian influence: "[a]ny use of public funds that bene-
fits schools under sectarian control or influence-regardless of
whether that benefit is characterized as 'indirect' or 'inciden-
tal'-violates [article IX, section 11 of the Washington Constitu-
tion]."8 With firm determination and vocal partisan support, the
Washington State Supreme Court has turned away from the
finely spun distinctions that have permeated the United States
Supreme Court's efforts in judging the merits of various state
aid plans.9
Weiss v. Bruno'° involved challenges to public funding of
tuition for needy students in kindergarten through twelfth grade
in public and private schools and to a tuition supplement pro-
gram for students in private higher education. Reasoning that
both programs supported the schools themselves and that the
schools were under sectarian control, the Washington State
Supreme Court invalidated the programs under article IX, sec-
tion 4 of the state constitution, which provides: "[a]ll schools
maintained or supported wholly or in part by the public funds
shall be forever free from sectarian control or influence."" The
court's view appears firm: the drafters of the state constitution
intended an absolute prohibition against use of public funds in
support of sectarian schools. This principle transcends related
principles under the first amendment and continues to be recog-
nized by the court.
Further support for this position is provided by the holdings
of the court in Mitchell v. Consolidated School District No.
8. Weiss v. Bruno, 82 Wash. 2d 199, 211, 509 P.2d 973, 981 (1973) (referring to
WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 11).
9. See infra § III of this Article.
10. 82 Wash. 2d 199, 509 P.2d 973 (1973).
11. Id. at 205-32, 509 P.2d at 977-92.
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20112 and Visser v. Nooksack Valley School District No. 506.13
In both cases the court voided legislation that would have pro-
vided publicly funded transportation for students attending any
school in accordance with mandatory attendance laws, including
private sectarian schools. Such assistance, the court held, vio-
lated both article IX, section 4 and article I, section 11: "no pub-
lic money or property shall be appropriated or applied to any
religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any
religious establishment."1
4
In Visser, the court was confronted by the claim that it
should permit publicly funded transportation because the
United States Supreme Court had recently interpreted the first
amendment to allow public transportation for parochial school
students.15 In rejecting this assertion, the court said:
Although the decisions of the United States supreme court are
entitled to the highest consideration as they bear on related
questions before this court, we must, in light of the clear provi-
sions of our state constitution and our decisions thereunder,
respectfully disagree with those portions of the Everson major-
ity opinion which might be construed, in the abstract, as stat-
ing that transportation, furnished at public expense, to chil-
dren attending religious schools, is not in support of such
schools. 16
In partial summary, the Mitchell, Visser, and Weiss deci-
sions, together with State Higher Education Assistance Author-
ity v. Graham,17 which struck down a state-sponsored college-
student loan program as violative of artigle IX, section 4 and
article I, section 11, severely restrict direct or indirect state
financial support of sectarian schools."
12. 17 Wash. 2d 61, 135 P.2d 79 (1943).
13. 33 Wash. 2d 699, 207 P.2d 198 (1949).
14. Visser, 33 Wash. 2d at 711-12, 207 P.2d at 205 (quoting WASH. CONST. art. I, §
11); Mitchell, 17 Wash. 2d at 65, 135 P.2d at 81 (quoting WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11).
15. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
16. 33 Wash. 2d at 711, 207 P.2d at 205 (emphasis in original).
17. 84 Wash. 2d 813, 817, 529 P.2d 1051, 1053-54 (1974).
18. In the recent case of Witters v. Commission for the Blind, 102 Wash. 2d 624, 689
P.2d 53 (1984), the Supreme Court of Washington held that it would be unconstitu-
tional-under the United States Constitution, but in dictum also under the "stricter"
language of the Washington Constitution-to provide state funds to a student who
wished to attend the Inland Empire School of the Bible. This blind student was denied
financial assistance because: "The provision of financial assistance by the State to enable
someone to become a pastor, missionary or church youth director clearly has the primary
effect of advancing religion." Id. at 629, 689 P.2d at 56. Concurring, the late Justice
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In a similar manner, the court has been quite consistent in
refusing to allow sectarian influence in the public schools. State
ex rel. Dearle v. Frazier19 and State ex rel. Clithero v.
Showalter20  prohibited the teaching of the Bible in public
schools on the ground that such courses contravened article I,
section 11 by using public funds for religious instruction. Cal-
vary Bible Presbyterian Church v. Board of Regents,2 a case in
which the court refused to enjoin the teaching of a course on the
Bible as literature at the University of Washington, is obviously
inconsistent with this approach. The distinguishing rationale
offered in Calvary Bible was that no religious "instruction" took
place because the course consisted of a scholarly examination of
the literature, rather than a manifestation of devotion to reli-
gious principles. 22 When the same course is taught in a church-
related school, however, religious instruction obviously occurs
because of where the course is taught.23
Finally, although the court intimated in Perry v. School
District No. 8124 that a release-time provision for religious
instruction in public schools would be consistent with article I,
section 11 and article IX, section 4,25 the particular program was
stricken because the schools participated by distributing regis-
tration cards and either making announcements about the pro-
gram in the classroom or allowing representatives of the reli-
Rosellini argued that state vocational funds paid to assist a student in this situation
would violate the "plain language" of the stricter Washington State Constitution. Id. at
632, 689 P.2d at 58.
19. 102 Wash. 369, 173 P. 35 (1918).
20. 159 Wash. 519, 293 P. 1000 (1930).
21. 72 Wash. 2d 912, 436 P.2d 189 (1967).
22. 72 Wash. 2d at 919, 436 P.2d at 193. The case does, however, seem to restrict the
value of the rather broad language of the earlier cases in their sweeping indictment of
the use of the Bible in public school teaching. In that sense, the case is a narrow reading
of WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11. This decision could effectively serve as a precedent should
the court desire to depart from its more restrictive approach.
Justice Utter, dissenting in Witters v. Commission for the Blind, 102 Wash. 2d 624,
689 P.2d 53 (1984), re-examines the historical basis for a commitment to a strict anti-
establishment position based on the state constitution and concludes, much as the
authors do on somewhat different grounds, that the strict position is unwarranted, at
least in the context of aid to students in higher education. Id. at 643-49, 689 P.2d at 64-
67 (Utter, J., dissenting).
23. Calvary Bible is not mentioned in Witters v. Commission for the Blind, 102
Wash. 2d 624, 689 P.2d 53 (1984), but the thrust of the majority seems to be not what is
being taught but where it is being taught.
24. 54 Wash. 2d 886, 344 P.2d 1036 (1959).
25. Id. at 892, 344 P.2d at 1040.
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gious groups to do so. 26 In this case, the court seemed to
construe the Washington provisions on establishment identically
with the United States Supreme Court's then current perception
of release time. The Washington court's view of the scope of
the prohibitions, however, remained unchanged, especially since
the court went through great pains to establish that a school dis-
trict could satisfy the constitutional limits only through total
noninvolvement 28 (that is, nonsectarian-influenced: no public
expenditure). The practical consequence of these separationist
rules would seem to fatally discourage release-time programs.
In the area of education, the Washington courts have virtu-
ally isolated religion from government, although total separation
of church and state may not be their intention. In Weiss, the
court noted that total "separation" at some point might violate
the free exercise of religion guaranteed by the first amend-
ment.29 Total separation might also violate the free-belief provi-
sions of article I, section 11 of the Washington Constitution.30
Thus, aside from the dictum in Perry suggesting how a
release-time provision could survive state constitutional scru-
tiny, 1 the court has on several occasions also recognized that
many indirect relationships that assist the functioning of secta-
rian activities are permitted, if not mandated, by equal protec-
tion or religious freedom requirements.2 Representative of these
26. Id. at 896-98, 344 P.2d at 1043. One may infer from the precision of the holding
that the program would have been sustained had the elements of involvement by the
school been absent.
27. Id. at 894-97, 344 P.2d at 1041-43.
28. Id. at 896-98, 344 P.2d at 1043-44.
29. 82 Wash. 2d at 206 n.2, 509 P.2d at 978 n.2.
30. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11. A related issue, that a strict anti-establishment posi-
tion based on state constitutional grounds would violate federal equal protection, was
argued and rejected in Witters v. Commission for the Blind, 102 Wash. 2d 624, 689 P.2d
53 (1984).
31. 54 Wash. 2d at 892-93, 344 P.2d at 1040.
32. City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 639 P.2d 1358 (1982).
The court stated that regulations concerning fire, health, and safety will be enforced
against parochial schools when the state proves:
That the specific concerns addressed by the regulations are of sufficient magni-
tude to outweigh the free exercise claim, that the non-application of the regu-
lations will threaten the public's health or other vital interests and that the
state's interest could not otherwise be satisfied in a way which would not
infringe on religious liberty.
Id. at 9, 639 P.2d at 1363. A similar position was taken in the earlier case of State ex rel.
Holcomb v. Armstrong, 39 Wash. 2d 860, 864, 239 P.2d 545, 548 (1952), in which the
court held that restrictions on religious freedom to act are permissible only to prevent
grave and immediate dangers that the state lawfully may protect. See also Larken v.
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partially developed doctrines is City of Sumner v. First Baptist
Church.33 In this recent case, the court recognized the funda-
mental nature of free exercise of religion, using an enhanced
scope of review to remand for further findings the application of
certain zoning requirements adverse to church schools. 4
The Washington court's basic approach to establishment of
religion issues under the state constitution is clear: any percepti-
ble state support that rises above provision of noncontroversial
government services is forbidden. That is, as long as the restric-
tion of state involvement would not violate equal protection
principles by singling out sectarian organizations for less than
similar treatment, the state can refuse to give any support to
religious or sectarian bodies and can refuse to recognize religious
beliefs or practices in any way connected to or intertwined with
state institutions, except those practices explicitly recognized in
the state constitution. 5
The critical, and as yet not carefully examined, problem
with this approach is that it will inevitably lead to antagonism
between a dedication to not supporting religion and a restraint
on inhibiting its practice.3 The Washington court, perhaps
because of the narrow range of cases that it has considered, and
perhaps also as a result of the emphasis in article I, section 11 of
the state constitution on protecting beliefs rather than action,
has not been forced to contemplate the spectacle of the snake of
anti-establishment doctrine eating its tail of free exercise of reli-
gion. There is little doubt that, as the United States Supreme
Court adopts a more pragmatic approach and changes religious
activity in public life, citizens in Washington may demand a
rethinking of the boundaries between nonsupport of religion and
the restriction of its practice.
After a brief excursion into the Byzantine complexities of
the United States Supreme Court's treatment of free exercise
and establishment cases, we will turn again to the textual gene-
Grendel's Den, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 505 (1983) (a comparable position on federal establish-
ment grounds in which a veto of liquor license granted to a church violated establish-
ment clause).
33. 97 Wash. 2d 1, 639 P.2d 1358 (1982).
34. Id. at 13, 639 P.2d at 1365.
35. WASH. CONST. amend. 34. See infra text accompanying note 128.
36. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 19 IA, at 1029 (2d
ed. 1983) (use of the term "tension" to describe this problem); see also L. TRIBE, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW § 19-2, at 815 (1978). Both texts form the basis for the broad overview
that follows.
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•sis of the Washington anti-establishment bias.
III. TENSION ON THE SACRED BATTLEMENTS: THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION IN AMERICA
The United States Supreme Court has followed a tortuous
and different path than the fairly straight one blazed by the
Washington Supreme Court in analysis of aid to religious bodies.
A. Kindergarten Through Twelfth Grade
In the seminal case of Everson v. Board of Education,3 7
decided in 1947, the Court upheld the payment of state funds
for transportation of sectarian school students. Since that time,
the Court has considered challenges to publicly funded programs
that:
(a) provided textbooks to students in sectarian and public
schools; 8
(b) subsidized the salaries of teachers of secular subjects in
private schools;39
(c) provided unrestricted grant payments for reimburse-
ment of the costs of mandated state services and testing pro-
vided by private schools;40
(d) allowed tuition reimbursement and tax credits for par-
ents of children in private schools; 41
(e) provided for secular and instructional materials as well
as public-employee directed educational testing of students in
private schools;42 and
(f) provided for subsidies for private school use of standard-
ized tests and for field trips. 3
37. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
38. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975);
Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
39. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
40. Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
41. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973);
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
42. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 371 n.21 (1975) (Court indicated that the state
could probably send public employees into the schools to diagnose and treat illness or
educational disabilities). See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), infra note 43 and
accompanying text, in which programs of this type were upheld.
43. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). The validity of public subsidies for pri-
vate school use of standardized tests, as well as such subsidies for collection and report-
ing of attendance and other data about students and teachers, was also recognized in
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 654 (1980).
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Throughout its analysis of these thorny questions, the Court
has had difficulty articulating the appropriate constitutional
doctrine for measurement of these efforts at state aid. What
emerges from the cases is a sense of a two-front war: the Court
jousting with itself and also with various state legislatures as the
latter attempted to find weaknesses in the Court's opinions in
order to fund some private education. Thus, the Court has
moved through at least two phases since Everson. In the first,
the Court used a two-part test: the "purpose and effect" test
developed in the school prayer cases, whereby a state aid pro-
gram must be secular in purpose and not have the effect of
advancing or inhibiting religious practices.4 Later, the Court
borrowed a three-part test from a decision upholding property
tax exemptions for religious schools."5 Under this test, a state
aid program must: (1) have a secular purpose; (2) not advance or
inhibit religion; and (3) provide only incidental aid to religion."'
As might be expected, this searching examination tended to
invalidate programs that probably could have withstood the ear-
lier test.47
In recent cases, the Justices' diverging analyses reveal an
extremely fragmented Court. Although facially still committed
to the three-part test, the Court seems to be divided on how to
apply it."8 The most that can be said about the current Court is
that the majority is less rigid in analyzing aid to private schools
and more likely to uphold facially neutral aid given equally to
public and to private schools than was its counterpart a mere
ten years ago.49 Some of these decisions suggest that the "entan-
44. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (challenge to state law
requiring Bible reading each day in the public schools); Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962) (challenge to a prayer composed by state officials and ordered to be read aloud by
each class).
45. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). The test was first applied to aid-to-
school cases in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
46. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 702-05 (1970).
47. Compare Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (textbook aid approved
under two-part test) with Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (aid for instructional
materials stricken under three-part test).
48. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 36, at 1037-38 (authors divide
the Court into three camps: Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist, and
O'Connor favoring financial assistance as long as it does not clearly aid religion; Justices
Blackmun and Powell adhering essentially to the three-part test; and Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens prohibiting aid).
49. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983), is a signal of this new majority. In
Mueller, the Court distinguished Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), and upheld a statute that allowed parents to deduct school
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glement" prong, the third prong of the three-part test, also
includes an independent analysis of the potential for political
divisiveness arising from aid programs.50
This fragmented pattern also emerges in three other areas
in which the establishment clause has recently been examined or
discussed.
B. Higher Education
In the context of aid to higher education, three major
cases,5' supported by summary affirmances in several others,52
suggest that a clear majority of the United States Supreme
Court is willing to uphold some state programs involving govern-
ment aid to students at private institutions or to the institutions
themselves, including sectarian ones. The Court approved pro-
grams authorizing federal grants53 or the issuance of state reve-
nue bonds54 for the construction of facilities, a program of state
grants for full-time students other than those attending "perva-
sively sectarian" institutions,55 and various programs providing
financial assistance for college students, including students in
attendance at sectarian schools.56 While the Court applies the
same test for analyzing programs aiding higher education that it
uses for primary and secondary education, the Court is less
inclined to strike aid programs at the college level for two rea-
sons: (1) there is a more easily identifiable secular purpose at the
college level;57 and (2) typically a less compelling need exists to
expenses from state income tax liability.
50. Ste, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 795-98 (1973) (discussing the natural tendency of modest support programs to
become entrenched and to expand over time, increasing commitment and involvement
and therefore heightening the potential for church-state strife).
51. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S.
734 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
52. Smith v. Board of Governors, 434 U.S. 803 (1977); Americans United for Separa-
tion of Church & State v. Blanton, 434 U.S. 803 (1977).
53. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
54. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973). Cf. State Higher Educ. Assistance Auth. v.
Graham, 84 Wash. 2d 813, 529 P.2d 1051 (1974). See also supra notes 21-22 and accom-
panying text.
55. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755 (1976). Cf. Weiss v. Bruno, 82
Wash. 2d 199, 509 P.2d 973 (1973) (Washington law providing public funds for financial
assistance to children attending private, religiously influenced schools was violative of
WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 4).
56. Smith v. Board of Governors, 434 U.S. 803 (1977); Americans United for Separa-
tion of Church & State v. Blanton, 434 U.S. 803 (1977).
57. See, e.g., Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 750-51 (1976) (Black-
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police the institution to separate religious and secular uses,5 8
and, consequently, establishment pressures resulting from the
entwinement of government and religion are reduced.
C. School Prayer
Purpose, effect, and entanglement are also now the bywords
in another type of establishment case: the school prayer case. In
Stone v. Graham,5" the Court prohibited the posting of the ten
commandments in public school classrooms. The Court imposed
the three-part test on all school prayer issues, thereby modifying
the approach, although not the result, in the earlier prayer
cases.60
D. Release Time
Should the Court again be faced with a challenge to a state
program allowing release time for public school students to
attend religious instruction classes, it likely would uphold such a
program, provided that the three-part test could be met. In the
cases applying the two-part test, one invalidating61 and the other
sustaining such a program, 2 the factors distinguishing the latter
were the absence of religious instructors at the school and the
lack of involvement by school officials in the coercion of stu-
dents.6 3 Under the three-part test, the lack of excessive entan-
glement would apparently salvage a carefully drafted release-
time program.
E. Is the Three-Part Test Collapsing?
There are some signs that the United States Supreme Court
is moving away from the three-part test toward a more relaxed
attitude in the evaluation of the church-state intersection. In
Marsh v. Chambers," the Court sustained a Nebraska Legisla-
mun, J., plurality opinion).
58. See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 687 (1971).
59. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
60. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (challenge to a statute
requiring Bible reading each day in the public schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962) (challenge to a prayer composed by state officials ordered to be read aloud by
each class).
61. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
62. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
63. Id. at 308-09, 311-12.
64. 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3333-37 (1983).
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ture's use of a chaplain, paid for with state funds,"5 and in
Lynch v. Donnelly,"6 the Court upheld a city's erection of a
nativity scene as part of a Christmas display in a park owned by
a nonprofit organization. Such decisions instructively combine
free exercise and establishment clause issues and thus present
more clearly the dilemma that the Washington court may soon
be required to resolve.
In both Marsh and Lynch, the Court applied the three-part
test, but added another dimension by taking notice of historical
incidents in which some accommodation of religion in public life
was allowed in order to avoid "callous indifference 6 7 in the
interpretation of the establishment clause. The Court also
placed less emphasis on the possibility of political divisiveness
resulting from the entanglement of church and state. 8 Chief
Justice Burger's opinion for the Court in Lynch clearly de-
emphasized the rigorous application of the three-part test in
favor of a careful case-by-case analysis of establishment clause
issues and rejected stilted "over-reactions" and "crabbed read-
ing of the Clause. '"69 When read together with Justice
O'Connor's concurrence rejecting the independent constitutional
significance of the political divisiveness issue70 and her proposal
that establishment issues be analyzed under what amounts to a
two-part test-(1) excessive entanglement of church and state;
or (2) government endorsement (or disapproval) of reli-
gion 71-these new cases suggest that the Court would sanction a
newly broadened accommodation of religion.7 2
Whether the Court will actually reformulate the three-part
test is not yet clear, and the Court has not explicitly abandoned
its tortuous path. Stitching together the Court's refusal to over-
rule the Everson case, however, plus its continued accommoda-
tion of neutral public aid to sectarian schools and its recent tilt
65. The Washington Constitution was amended in 1904 specifically to accommodate
chaplains in state institutions. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11 (1889, amended 1904, 1957).
66. 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1366 (1984).
67. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1360-61; Marsh, 103 S. Ct. at 3333-37. See Zorach v. Clau-
son, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
68. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1364-65 (1984) (the Court's discus-
sion pointed out the lack of evidence of political friction or divisiveness over the creche).
69. Id. at 1365-66.
70. Id. at 1367 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 1366.
72. It is interesting to note that the dissenters in Lynch accuse the Court of aban-
doning the prior rigorous approach to the establishment clause. Id. at 1370 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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toward accommodation of some religious practices in public life,
one recognizes that the United States Supreme Court's refusal
to espouse a doctrinaire ideology is a more flexible approach
than the Washington Supreme Court has adopted.7
The rigid position taken by the Washington court is a com-
pound of strict separationist personal beliefs74 and of the correl-
ative, unwavering insistence that such an approach is mandated
by the special language of the various separationist clauses in
the state constitution. 75 A court, of course, always invokes the
"plain language" approach when articulating a dogmatic state-
ment that must be accepted on faith. Anything that is "too clear
for argument" is an article of faith that must be accepted as a
divine spark.
One rationale for this dogma must be respected because it
expresses the sincere theological beliefs espoused by some of the
founders of the republic. 76 As the majority pointed out in Lynch
v. Donnelly, however, equally compelling historical evidence
demonstrates that many others of that same era did not sub-
scribe to these beliefs and embraced a more pragmatic and
accommodating set of values.77
The dogmatic hostility to church-related schools that has
permeated the opinions of the Washington Supreme Court has
broad historical roots in the valiant effort to save the West from
the twin evils of polygamy and popery. Perhaps the Washington
court could be persuaded to rise to a higher plane of judicial
statesmanship and rethink the rigid doctrinal commitments of
the past in the light of present economic realities.
73. Notice should be taken of the Court's balancing, in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263 (1981), of a state's strict anti-establishment clause against the free exercise and free
speech clauses of the first amendment. In Widmar, the Court struck a state policy limit-
ing use of university facilities for religious worship and teaching. In this "public forum"
case, the Court concluded that the federal establishment clause was not violated and
that the state's interest in separation of church and state was limited by the first amend-
ment. Further, the modern view of state court involvement in ecclesiastical disputes,
which seems to be less deferential to hierarchical religious authority, suggests a more
permeable barrier between church and state than previously existed. See Jones v. Wolf,
443 U.S. 595 (1979).
74. See, e.g., Weiss v. Bruno, 82 Wash. 2d 199, 205-09 (1973).
75. See infra text accompanying note 128.
76. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 719-27 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(reprint of Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance").
77. 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1366 (1984).
424 University of Puget Sound Law Review
IV. THE WEST IS SAVED FROM POLYGAMY AND POPERY
Two great policy issues regarding the role of religion in pub-
lic life preoccupied the politicians who guided the United States
during the waning years of the Grant administration and for
more than a decade thereafter. The Mormon question shaped
the meaning and interpretation of the free exercise clause of the
United States Constitution in a series of decisions that are, in
many ways, still "the law" today. The Catholic question, which
revolved around public funds for parochial schools, opened the
White House to the first Democratic candidate since the seces-
sion and left behind an ambiguous, sometimes acrimonious
heritage.
A. The Mormon Question
On July 12, 1843, Joseph Smith announced the revelation
that patriarchal marriage was the mandate of heaven. This reve-
lation set in motion a chain of events culminating in a sweeping
series of decisions that fleshed out the skeletal outlines of the
free exercise clause of the first amendment. 78 The Mormons
were driven west, settled in the territory of Utah, and in 1851
sought admission to the Union as the state of Deseret.
The southern delegations to Congress and their constituents
were appalled by the practice of polygamy, and the prospect of
Deseret's admission was never seriously entertained. The craft of
politics, however, made the slave states unwilling allies of the
Mormons and prevented Congress from enacting an anti-
polygamy law. If Congress could outlaw polygamy in the territo-
ries of the United States, it could also outlaw the peculiar insti-
tution upon which the economy of the South rested. It was
therefore unthinkable to permit Congress to address the Mor-
mon question directly.
Mr. Lincoln at one point suggested that the Mormon ques-
tion be treated like an immovable log: simply plow around it
until time resolves the problem.8 0 But with the guns at Fort
Sumter and Bull Run the Mormons lost their cardinal protec-
tors, and Congress moved swiftly in 1862 to resolve the Mormon
78. An excellent and thorough treatment of the Mormon cases may be found in Lin-
ford, The Mormons and the Law: The Polygamy Cases (pts. 1-2), 9 UTAH L. REV. 308,
543 (1964-1965).
79. See Morgan, The State of Deseret, 8 UTAH HIST. Q. § 7 (1940).
80. See Linford, supra note 78, (pt. 1), at 317.
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question:"1
Section 1 of this anti-Mormon act sought to outlaw polyg-
amy by prohibiting bigamy.
Section 2 voided the territorial legislature's incorporation of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.
Section 3 was the first mortmain statute enacted by Con-
gress and provided that no religious or charitable association
could acquire or hold real property worth more than fifty thou-
sand dollars in any territory of the United States.8 2
Having "solved" the Mormon question, Congress turned to
the more pressing problems, such as the vitalization of Mr. Lin-
coln's army. Meanwhile, in Utah, the Mormons ignored the new
law and continued to prosper and multiply. In time they grew
confident and sought to have the 1862 anti-Mormon act83 invali-
dated by the courts because they devoutly believed that it vio-
lated the freedom of religion guaranteed by the United States
Constitution.
The sacrificial lamb selected for a friendly test case was
George Reynolds, Brigham Young's secretary. He was tried and
found guilty of having violated the 1862 law because he had two
wives."4 Reynolds' name became a household word in constitu-
tional history when the United States Supreme Court, in Reyn-
olds v. United States,85 upheld his conviction in the terse syntax
of Mr. Justice Waite: "Laws are made for the government of
actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious
belief and opinions, they may with practices."86 Government
could exist only in name under such circumstances. Probably no
other case in the Court's history better illustrates the dynamic
power of the Court to generate a consensus in the body politic,
81. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 126, 12 Stat. 501 (1862).
82. Id. §§ 1-3. The mortmain statute survived for many years, codified at 48 U.S.C.
§ 1480 (1890):
No corporation or association for religious or charitable purposes shall acquire
or hold real estate in any Territory during the existence of the Territorial gov-
ernment of a greater value than $50,000; and all real estate acquired or held by
such corporation or association contrary hereto shall be forfeited and escheat
to the United States; but existing vested rights in real estate shall not be
impaired by the provisions of this section.
The mortmain statute was repealed in 1978 by Pub. L. 95-584, § 1, 92 Stat. 2483 (1978).
83. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 126, 12 Stat. 501 (1862).
84. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 147 (1878).
85. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
86. Id. at 166.
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or to coalesce a nascent consensus. Both President Hayes8 7 and
new President Arthur"" denounced polygamy (and Mormonism),
triggering Congress to enact the Edmunds Act."'
The Edmunds Act was a comprehensive review of the Mor-
mon question and sought to leave no stone unturned in the
effort to resolve the issue once and for all. Section 1 of the Act
outlawed polygamy, but defined it in substantially the same
manner as bigamy had been defined under previous law. Section
3 went beyond the polygamy issue and outlawed cohabitation
with more than one woman. The significance of this provision
was that, in order to prove bigamy or polygamy, it was necessary
to prove "marriages," and in Utah no records were kept except
by the church. Subsequent sections of the Act permitted a per-
son to be challenged for cause as a juror if that person lived in
polygamy, bigamy, or unlawful cohabitation; and prohibited any
bigamist or polygamist from holding office or voting. Section 9
declared all voter registration and election offices in Utah to be
vacant and created a new commission to register all persons in
Utah.
Armed with section 3 of the Act, Judge Zane headed to
Utah in 1884 and, with the support of a motley assortment of
bounty hunters, began to crack down on Mormonism. Among
the cases tried under the new law, Cannon v. United States91
stood for the proposition that the government need not show
any acts of sexual contact in order to convict a defendant of
unlawful cohabitation. The government needed only to show
that the defendant lived in the same house with two women and
ate at their respective tables one-third of his time, or
thereabouts.2
Meanwhile, the territorial legislature of Idaho, which was
much closer to the spectre of Mormonism than was the United
States Congress, adopted an ironclad anti-polygamy oath for all
87. 7 J. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 606
(1897).
88. 8 J. RICHARDSON, supra note 87, at 57.
89. Act of Mar. 22, 1882, ch. 47, 22 Stat. 30 (1882).
90. See 3 0. WHITNEY, HISTORY OF UTAH 341-43 (1898).
91. 116 U.S. 55 (1885).
92. Id. at 74-80. A more enduring statement of civil liberties was made by the Court
in In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274 (1887). Snow had been charged with three counts of unlawful
cohabitation: count 1 for the year 1885; count 2 for 1884; count 3 for 1883. The Court
held that when a person is charged with a continuous offense, the charge cannot be artifi-
cially divided into time periods. Id. at 284. Snow continues to be good law.
[Vol. 8:411
1985] Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause 427
prospective voters and candidates:
I do further swear that I am not a bigamist or polygamist; that
I am not a member of any order, organization or association
which teaches, advises, counsels or encourages its members,
devotees or any other person to commit the crime of bigamy or
polygamy, or any other crime defined by law, as a duty arising
or resulting from membership in such order, organization or
association, or which practises bigamy, polygamy or plural or
celestial marriage as a doctrinal rite of such organization; that I
do not and will not, publicly or privately, or in any manner
whatever teach, advise, counsel or encourage any person to
commit the crime of bigamy or polygamy, or any other crime
defined by law, either as a religious duty or otherwise."
In Murphy v. Ramsey,94 the Court upheld section 8 of the
Edmunds Act, which stated that a "polygamist, bigamist or any
person cohabiting with more than one woman" could not vote or
hold office. In Murphy, the Court did not discuss the constitu-
tional problems of free exercise of religion, saving that discus-
sion for Davis v. Beason,9 wherein Samuel D. Davis and others
had been indicted for a "conspiracy to unlawfully pervert and
obstruct the due administration of the law" after taking the oath
when they were not entitled to do so.
The curious thing about the Court's opinion in Davis is the
summary manner in which it dismissed all constitutional objec-
tions with the simple statement that the ironclad oath was not
open to "any valid legal objection to which our attention has
been called." 9 Significantly, the Court in Davis goes far beyond
the mere outlawing of criminal acts such as polygamy or bigamy
and extends civil disabilities to mere membership in an organi-
zation that teaches or practices such ideas. In plain English,
Davis stands for the proposition that it is constitutional to enact
a statute that makes it a crime to be a Mormon."
The voracious appetite for justice for the Mormons was
93. Idaho Rev. Stat. 1887, ch. 4, § 504.
94. 114 U.S. 15 (1885). In Murphy, the Court read the ex post facto clause as a
restriction on criminal punishment only. Thus, even though it was not a crime to have
been a polygamist or bigamist in the past, a person could still be prohibited from voting
or holding office because these are not criminal penalties. Id. at 40-44.
95. 133 U.S. 333, 334 (1890) (defendants convicted for unlawfully taking oath
adopted by the Territorial Legislature of Idaho, which required prospective voters and
candidates to swear that they did not practice or encourage bigamy or polygamy).
96. Id. at 334-35.
97. Id. at 347.
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merely whetted, not assuaged, by the plethora of prosecutions
under the Edmunds Act. Congress reacted to the continuous
pressure by enacting the Edmunds-Tucker Act"8 as an ultimate
solution to the Mormon question.
To facilitate prosecutions of polygamists, the Edmunds-
Tucker Act provided inter alia that adultery could be punished
by three years in prison. In addition, someone other than the
offended spouse could raise the charge of adultery. Another pro-
vision of the Act required that every marriage be certified and
all records filed with the probate court as a matter of permanent
record. Section 13 ordered the Attorney General of the United
States to institute proceedings to forfeit and escheat to the
United States all property held in violation of the 1862 anti-
Mormon act, which had voided the incorporation of the church.
On July 30, 1877, legal action commenced in Utah that
culminated in Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints v. United States.9 9 In this case, the
Supreme Court upheld the revocation of the incorporation of the
church and ordered that all personal property of the church be
escheated to the United States together with all real property
except the congressionally exempted burial grounds and houses
of worship."°
98. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 397, 24 Stat. 635 (1887).
99. 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
100. Justice Bradley wrote for the Court:
It is distinctly stated in the pleadings and findings of fact, that the prop-
erty of said corporation was held for the purpose of religious and charitable
uses. But it is also stated in the findings of fact, and is a matter of public
notoriety, that the religious and charitable uses intended to be subserved and
promoted are the inculcation and spread of the doctrines and usages of the
Mormon Church, or Church of Latter-Day Saints, one of the distinguishing
features of which is the practice of polygamy-a crime against the laws, and
abhorrent to the sentiments and feelings of the civilized world. Notwithstand-
ing the stringent laws which have been passed by Congress-notwithstanding
all the efforts made to suppress this barbarous practice-the sect or commu-
nity composing the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints perseveres, in
defiance of law, in preaching, upholding, promoting and defending it. It is a
matter of public notoriety that its emissaries are engaged in many countries in
propagating this nefarious doctrine, and urging its converts to join the commu-
nity in Utah. The existence of such a propaganda is a blot on our civilization.
The organization of a community for the spread and practice of polygamy is, in
a measure, a return to barbarism. It is contrary to the spirit of Christianity and
of the civilization which Christianity has produced in the Western world. The
question, therefore, is whether the promotion of such a nefarious system and
practice, so repugnant to our laws and to the principles of our civilization, is to
be allowed to continue by the sanction of the government itself; and whether
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In summary, the Mormon cases stood for the proposition
that the free exercise of religion, secured by the first amend-
ment, is a guarantee of absolute freedom of belief. If a substan-
tial number of fellow citizens are annoyed by this belief,1 °1 how-
ever, and outlaw one or more of one's religious practices, the
courts also permitted the state or the federal government to:
the funds accumulated for that purpose shall be restored to the same unlawful
uses as heretofore, to the detriment of the true interests of civil society.
It is unnecessary here to refer to the past history of the sect, to their defi-
ance of the government authorities, to their attempt to establish an indepen-
dent community, to their efforts to drive from the territory all who were not
connected with them in communion and sympathy. The tale is one of patience
on the part of the American government and people, and of contempt of
authority and resistance to law on the part of the Mormons. Whatever persecu-
tions they may have suffered in the early part of their history, in Mississippi
and Illinois, they have no excuse for their persistent defiance of law under the
government of the United States.
One pretence for this obstinate course is, that their belief in the practice
of polygamy, or in the right to indulge in it, is a religious belief, and, therefore,
under the protection of the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom. This
is altogether a sophistical plea. No doubt the Thugs of India imagined that
their belief in the right of assassination was a religious belief; but their think-
ing so did not make it so. The practice of suttee by the Hindu widows may
have sprung from a supposed religious conviction. The offering of human sacri-
fices by our own ancestors in Britain was no doubt sanctioned by an equally
conscientious impulse. But no one, on that account, would hesitate to brand
these practices, now, as crimes against society, and obnoxious to condemnation
and punishment by the civil authority.
The State has a perfect right to prohibit polygamy, and all other open
offences against the enlightened sentiment of mankind, notwithstanding the
pretence of religious conviction by which they may be advocated and practiced.
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333. And since polygamy has been forbidden by the
laws of the United States, under severe penalties, and since the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints has persistently used and claimed the right
to use, and the unincorporated community still claims the same right to use,
the funds with which the late corporation was endowed for the purpose of pro-
moting and propagating the unlawful practice as an integral part of their reli-
gious usages, the question arises, whether the government, finding these funds
without legal ownership, has or has not, the right, through its courts, and in
due course of administration, to cause them to be seized and devoted to objects
of undoubted charity and usefulness-such for example as the maintenance of
schools-for the benefit of the community whose leaders are now misusing
them in the unlawful manner above described; setting apart, however, for the
exclusive possession and use of the church, sufficient and suitable portions of
the property for the purposes of public worship, parsonage buildings and bury-
ing grounds, as provided in the law.
136 U.S. at 48-50.
101. See Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 399 (1941) (depicting Jeho-
vah's Witnesses as "a sect distinguished by great religious zeal and astonishing powers of
annoyance").
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(1) criminally prosecute anyone who practices the
disfavored religion;1°2
(2) ban any member of a sect from voting or hold-
ing public office, regardless of whether he or she prac-
tices the disfavored acts;10 3 and
(3) abolish the church as an institution and seize
all of its property (including burial grounds and houses
of worship if Congress so decrees)."'
On September 25, 1890, Mormon President Wilford Wood-
ruff issued the "Woodruff Manifesto," wherein he declared his
intention to submit to the laws that proscribed polygamy and
advised all Latter-Day Saints to refrain from contracting any
marriage prohibited by the laws of the land. Whether this "reve-
lation" was a change in doctrine is hotly disputed to this date.
Congress appears to have been satisfied, however, because in
1893 it ordered the personal property of the church restored and
in 1896, the real property. Utah was admitted to the Union on
January 4, 1896, with an unrepealable constitutional provision
that forever outlaws polygamy.
B. The Catholic Question
In 1875 President Grant touched upon a raw nerve when, in
an address to the convention of the Army of the Tennessee, he
stated:
Encourage free schools, and resolve that not one dollar appro-
priated for their support shall be appropriated to the support
of any sectarian schools. Resolve that neither the State nor
nation, nor both combined shall support institutions of learn-
ing other than those sufficient to afford every child growing up
in the land the opportunity of a good common-school educa-
tion, unmixed with sectarian, pagan or atheistical dogmas.
Leave the matter of religion to the family altar, the church and
the private school, supported entirely by private contributions.
Keep the church and the state forever separate." 5
102. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 166 (1878). See supra note 84 and accompa-
nying text.
103. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890). See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying
text.
104. Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890). See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
105. The President's Speech at Des Moines, 22 CATH. WORLD 433, 434-35 (1876).
See McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 218 (1947).
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The parochial school system began to develop in New York
City and other urban centers during the 1840s, partially in
response to the nondenominational Protestantism that was
being inculcated in the "public schools." For example, in 1848
Horace Mann, the greatest of American public school exponents,
issued his final report to the Massachusetts Board of Education,
in which he expounded upon the need to continue the funda-
mentally religious character of the "nonsectarian" public
schools.'
A second aspect of the public school question was the utili-
zation in the public schools of various texts containing religious
and ethnic slurs; for example, "popery," "deceitful Catholics,"
"the Pilgrims fled from the persecution of Catholics," and "there
is no doubt the lower classes of Ireland are so."""
In President Grant's annual message to Congress on Decem-
ber 7, 1875, he called for a constitutional amendment to prohibit
the use of public funds for sectarian schools. 08 In the same
remarkable message, President Grant urged that the traditional
tax exemption for religious property be abolished so that prop-
erty would be taxed equally "whether church or corporation,
exempting only the last resting place of the dead, and possibly,
with proper restrictions, church edifices." 0 9
On December 14, 1875, in response to the President's call,
Mr. Blaine of Maine introduced the Blaine amendment, which
provided:
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of
106. H. MANN, ANNUAL REPORT, 1845-1848 (1891).
I believe then [1837] as now, that religious instruction in our schools, to
the extent which the Constitution and the laws of the State allowed and pre-
scribed, was indispensable to their highest welfare, and essential to the vitality
of moral education.
I avail myself of this, the last opportunity which I may ever have, to say in
regard to all affirmations or intimations that I have ever attempted to exclude
religious instruction from the schools, or to exclude the Bible from the schools,
or to impair the force of that volume, that they are now, and always have been,
without substance or semblance of truth.
Our system earnestly inculcates all Christian morals; it founds its morals
on the basis of religion; it welcomes the religion of the Bible; and in receiving
the Bible, it allows it to do what it is allowed to do in no other system, to speak
for itself.
107. See STOKES & PHELPS, Incidental References to Religion in Textbooks, in 2
CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 572 (1958).
108. Annual Message of the President of the United States, 4 CONG. REc. 175
(1875).
109. Id.
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religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no money
raised by taxation in any State for the support of public
schools, or derived from any public fund therefore, nor any
public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of
any religious sect, nor shall any money so raised or lands so
devoted be divided between religious sects or denominations." 0
On August 4, 1876, the Blaine amendment passed the House
by a vote of 180-7111 and began to move through the Senate,
where, on August 11, a much longer version was approved. " 2
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no reli-
gious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office
or public trust under any State. No public property, and no
public revenue of, nor any loan of credit by or under the
authority of, the United States, or any State, Territory, Dis-
trict, or municipal corporation, shall be appropriated to, or
made or used for, the support of any school, educational or
other institution, under the control of any religious or anti-reli-
gious sect, organization, or denomination, or wherein the par-
ticular creed or tenets of any religious or anti-religious sect,
organization, or denomination shall be taught; and no such
particular creed or tenets shall be read or taught in any school
or institution supported in whole or in part by such revenue or
loan of credit; and no such appropriation or loan of credit shall
be made to any religious or anti-religious sect, organization, or
denomination, or to promote its interests or tenets. This article
shall not be construed to prohibit the reading of the Bible in
any school or institution; and it shall not have the effect to
impair rights of property already vested. " 3
This expanded version of the Blaine amendment could not
muster the necessary two-thirds vote in the Senate, and the
effort to modify the federal Constitution died in chambers.""
The defeat of the proposed Blaine amendment, however, was by
no means the end of the controversy. In 1884 when the "plumed
knight," James G. Blaine of Maine, was the Republican stan-
dardbearer against Grover Cleveland, the Catholic question cost
the Republican Party its entrenched position in the White
110. H.R.J. Res. 1, 44th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 CONG. REC. 205 (1875).
111. Id. at 5191 (1876).
112. Id. at 5457.
113. Id. at 5453.
114. Id. at 5595.
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House. The defeat of Blaine in this bitterly partisan campaign
resulted from Blaine's reluctance to disavow the exuberance of
his ardent supporter, the Reverend Samuel Burchard, who
denounced the Democrats as the party of "rum, Romanism and
rebellion." The backlash brought out the "Catholic" vote with a
vengeance, thus placing New York in the Democratic column by
a scant 1,087 votes and Mr. Cleveland in the White House."'
More significant for our purposes is the fact that the sub-
stantial majorities in Congress, which had endorsed the principle
of the Blaine amendment, required that any new states to the
Union must, as a condition of admission, enact "Blaine amend-
ments" in their state constitutional documents as a part of their
"compact" with the United States. These Blaine amendments
could not be changed nor otherwise modified without the con-
sent of Congress.'16
Before directing our attention to that topic, however, fair-
ness requires that some mention be made of what may be per-
ceived as a substantial basis for opposition to aid for parochial
115. To complete the picture, the following details should be added:
The first proposal to amend the Constitution and prohibit appropriations to secta-
rian schools was made by Mr. Burdett of Missouri on April 18, 1870. CONG. GLOBE, 41st
Cong., 2d Sess. 2754 (1870). In 1871 Senator Stewart of Nevada proposed a similar
amendment. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 206 (1871).
While the Blaine amendment was pending, Congressman O'Brien of Maryland pro-
posed an amendment that would exclude ministers of religion from public office and
forbid appropriations to religious sects. H.R.J. Res. 36, 44th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 CONG.
REc. 440 (1876).
Amendments forbidding payment of public funds to sectarian schools were also pro-
posed in the House by Mr. Williams of Wisconsin, H.R.J. Res. 44, 44th Cong., 1st Sess., 4
CONG. REc. 476 (1876), and by Mr. Lawrence of Ohio, H.R.J. Res. 163, 44th Cong., 1st
Sess., 4 CONG. REC. 5318-19 (1876).
In 1878 Senator Edmunds of Vermont proposed a constitutional amendment that
forbade the states to make any law respecting an establishment of religion or to appro-
priate public funds to sectarian schools. S.J. Res. 13, 45th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 CONG. REC.
252 (1878).
In 1880 Mr. McCoid of Iowa proposed an amendment that required the states to
maintain free public schools and made attendance at public or private schools for five
years a prerequisite for voting. This amendment also prohibited the expenditure of pub-
lic funds for sectarian schools. H.R.J. Res. 344, 46th Cong., 3d Sess., 11 CONG. REc. 107
(1880).
Finally, in 1888 Senator Blair of New Hampshire introduced an amendment that
would prohibit the grant of public funds to sectarian schools. S.J. Res. 86, 50th Cong.,
1st Sess., 19 CONG. REC. 4615 (1888).
Further details may be found in: Ames & Herman, The Proposed Amendments to
the Constitution of the United States During the First Century of its History, in 2
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HIST. ASS'N FOR THE YEAR 1896 (1897).
116. See, e.g., Washington Enabling Act, ch. 180, § 4, 25 Stat. 676 (1889).
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schools. There is no doubt that the flames of bigotry were
fanned by the Know Nothings, the Ku Klux Klan, and the
American Protective Association (APA), to mention only a few
of the organizations on the lunatic fringe. But the prejudice of
the hate-mongers was able to influence substantially the Ameri-
can mainstream because some leaders of the Catholic Church
demonstrated an incredible insensitivity to political realities in
the United States. It would, in fact, be difficult to find two more
reactionary personages in the history of the papacy than Greg-
ory XVI (1831-1846) and Pius IX (1846-1878).
Gregory, an autocrat among autocrats, longed to turn the
clock back to the golden age of absolute monarchy that preceded
the French Revolution. On August 15, 1832, Gregory issued
Mirari Vos, 117 an encyclical condemning separation of church
and state, "liberalism," freedom of opinion, and freedom of the
press. In fairness, it must be added that the literal translation of
Gregory's encyclical is terribly misleading; but in the politics of
nineteenth-century America, what the Pope appeared to say
counted for far more than what he actually said.
Pius IX gained few admirers in the North when he failed to
condemn slavery as a moral outrage, and his brief diplomatic
flirtation with the Confederacy did not help his public image.' 8
Pius IX is notorious, however, for his encyclical Quanta Cura,
dated November 8, 1864, because attached to the encyclical was
a Syllabus of Errors, officially called "Syllabus of the principal
errors of our time, which are censured in the consistorial Allocu-
tions, Encyclicals and other Apostolical Letters of our Most
Holy Lord, Pope Pius IX."' 9 This extremely negative document
denounced as error the following statements:
15. Every man is free to embrace and profess that
religion which, guided by the light of reason,
he shall consider true. (Allocution Maxima
quidem, June 9, 1862;120 Damnatio "Mul-
tiplices inter," June 10, 1851).121
117. See R. CORRIGAN, THE CHURCH AND THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1938); BENDIC-
TINE MONKS OF SOLESMES, THE CHURCH 124-27 (M. O'Gorman trans. 1962) [hereinafter
cited as THE CHURCH].
118. STOKES & PHELPS, supra note 107, at 241-43.
119. See E. HALES, Pio NONo: A STUDY IN EUROPEAN POLITICS AND RELIGION IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY (1954). See also THE CHURCH, supra note 117, at 178.
120. THE CHURCH, supra note 117, at 168.
121. Id. at 153-54.
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47. The best theory of civil society requires that
popular schools open to children of every class
of the people, and generally, all public insti-
tutes intended for instruction in letters and
philosophical sciences and for carrying on the
education of youth, should be freed from all
ecclesiastical authority, control and interfer-
ence, and should be fully subjected to the civil
and political power at the pleasure of the rul-
ers, and according to the standard of the prev-
alent opinions of the age. (Epistle to the
Archbishop of Freiburg "Quum non sine,"
July 14, 1864).22
In the rarefied stratosphere of epistemological logicism that
preoccupied the theologians of the time, the papal condemnation
of one proposition did not mean that its converse was true.
Thus, to say that the statement "all white men are thieves" is
false does not mean that no white man is a thief. But whatever
these abstractions may have meant in a Europe affected by the
full-blown development of the industrial age, the metaphysical
niceties of nuance were lost upon the American public. The com-
mon patron of taverns, together with not a few enlightened indi-
viduals, simply heard what was said and reacted with outrage.
The issue was further clouded by the uproar resulting from the
declaration of papal infallibility that emanated from the Vatican
Council in 1870.123
To the popular mind, it appeared that the Pope was seeking
to enslave men's minds by seizing control of the schools and
declaring himself infallible. This approach obviously would have
suppressed all dissent and would have deprived Americans of
their cherished liberties. While compelling reasons existed to
oppose any expenditure of public funds, the concept of funding
the dissemination of these abhorrent ideas was unthinkable.
With this background in mind, one can better appreciate the
impetus to include a Blaine amendment in each new state
122. Id. at 174.
123. Bishop Edward Fitzgerald, Bishop of Little Rock, was one of only two delegates
to Vatican Council I who voted non placet [no] on the issue of papal infallibility. Upon
his return to the United States, it is reported that he complained about other votes being
stolen by the papal forces who had the audacity to round up votes during siesta. In the
final weighing of votes, however, the big rock outweighed Little Rock.
436 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 8:411
constitution.
V. CONVERGENCE OF ANTI-MORMON AND ANTI-CATHOLIC
SENTIMENT IN THE WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION
On February 22, 1889, Congress approved enabling legisla-
tion providing for the division of the Dakotas into two states
and permitting the people of North Dakota, South Dakota,
Montana, and Washington to draft constitutions, form state gov-
ernments, and to be admitted into the Union on an equal foot-
ing with the original states.124 This legislation contained very
specific provisions regarding religion. Section 4 provided in part:
[A]nd said conventions shall provide, by ordinances irrevocable
without the consent of the United States and the people of
said states: First: That perfect toleration of religious sentiment
shall be secured and that no inhabitant of said State shall ever
be molested in person or property on account of his or her
mode of religious worship . ..Fourth: That provision shall be
made for establishment and maintenance of systems of public
schools which shall be open to all the children of said States
and free from sectarian control.
125
Senator Blair of New Hampshire rose to explain that the fourth
provision "is a feature of redeeming, of saving grace, and of the
greatest importance.
1 2 6
124. Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676 (1889).
125. Id. § 4.
126. The dialogue in the Congressional Record is as follows:
Now Mr. President, not to occupy too long the time of Senate, I will call atten-
tion to one other feature in this report which I am very glad to commend: I
find on page 5, paragraph 4, this provision:
Fourth, That provision shall be made for the establishment and
maintenance of systems of public schools, which shall be open to all
the children of said States, and free from sectarian control.
There, sir, is a feature of redeeming, of saving grace, and of the very great-
est importance, as it seems to me. It is the substance of a constitutional
amendment now pending before this body designed to secure the same in sub-
stance to the people of all the States and those already in the Union as well as
to those which may hereafter be admitted. That amendment I consider the
most important measure now pending in the United States in any legislative
body or before the great forum of the people. We have made some advance in
the hearings upon that amendment before the Committee on Education and
Labor and we shall make still more, and I take this opportunity to express my
gratification that this leading feature is recognized and is to be adopted in the
fundamental law of these States. This makes a precedent, compliance with
which will require the extension of the provisions of this amendment to all the
States in the Union.
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Senator Blair went on to remark that although the enabling
Nor, Mr. President, is this a matter upon which there is but slight public
interest. All over the country our people are learning that a great question has
arisen. It is this: Which shall be the survivor, the common school or the paro-
chial, the denominational school in this country? That is the really leading
issue of the immediate future so far as the politics of this country are
concerned.
I have in my hand the expression of sentiment of many of the leading
citizens of one of the great cities of this country, which in this connection, I
will read to the Senate. It is a memorial addressed to the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled, in behalf of the
citizens of Philadelphia, and it showeth:
To the Senate and House of Representatives in Congress assembled:
This memorial, on behalf of citizens of Philadelphia, showeth: Two grave
dangers threaten at this hour the American system of common schools, the
atheistic tendency in education and the strenuous demand for a division of the
school funds in the interest of sectarian or denominational schools. Through
the former tendency the reading of the Christian Scriptures and the offering of
prayer have been forbidden in the schools of some of our principal cities, while
one at least has gone so far as to throw out of her schools every text-book
containing any reference to God. This attempt to exclude all religious ideas
from the instruction given in the public schools we hold to be both
unphilosophical and inimical to the public good, because it neglects the moral
faculties, which are the most important faculties of man, and the right exercise
of which is most important to the State; and because it does not correspond to
the character of the institutions for which the common school is designed to
prepare the citizens of this Republic.
Mr. PAYNE. What is the paper from which the Senator is reading?
Mr. BLAIR. It is the memorial of citizens of Philadelphia.
Mr. PAYNE. Will the Senator state in what States the practices referred
to are said to prevail?
Mr. BLAIR. It is alluding to many of the prominent cities in different
States, quite a number, some fifteen or twenty cities in different parts of the
country where this has been done, as I am informed.
On the other hand, to accept the proposal for a division of the school
funds would be for the State to destroy the whole school system which we have
built up with so much care and at such vast expense; to renounce all responsi-
ble or effective control of the work of education, and to become a mere tax-
gatherer for the sects. The one great argument by which this proposal is sus-
tained is that Christian parents can not accept for their children an education
which, while ostensibly neutral, is virtually hostile to religion. The adoption of
the secular theory of education, therefore, so far from reconciling those who
advocate the division of the funds, only stimulates them to fresh efforts, and
supplies them with fresh arguments against the public schools. These two
adverse tendencies, therefore, assist each other, and between them there is
danger that our school system may perish or be seriously crippled at the very
time when it is most urgently needed; for, more than any other single institu-
tion, it may be regarded as the digestive organ of the body-politic through
which we assimilate to the national character the foreign elements which every
year brings in increasing volume to our shores.
Against both these dangers we shall provide most effectively by simply
keeping our school system on the foundations where it was placed by our
fathers. We believe that the time has come when constitutional safeguards
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act was deficient because it did not provide for women's suf-
ought to be erected in the nation's fundamental law around this most precious
institution. We have, therefore, observed with pleasure the introduction of a
joint resolution now pending before one of your honorable bodies (Senate Res.
86) proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States which,
while it recognizes the Christian character and purpose of our system of public
education, forbids the appropriation of public money to any school or institu-
tion in which the peculiar doctrines or ceremonials of any religious sect or
denomination are practiced or taught; and we earnestly pray that you will
speedily submit this or some similar amendment to the Legislatures of the sev-
eral States for their approval.
In this connection we are reminded that General Grant, when President,
recommended to Congress the passage of an amendment to the national Con-
stitution 'prohibiting the granting of any school funds or school taxes, or any
part thereof, either by legislative, municipal, or other authority, for the benefit
or in aid, directly or indirectly, of any religious sect or denomination.' The
Republican national convention, at Cincinnati, June 15, 1876, recommended
,an amendment to the Constitution of the United States forbidding the appli-
cation of any public funds or property for the benefit of any schools or institu-
tions under sectarian control.'
The Democratic national platform, adopted in the same year at St. Louis,
declared for the maintenance of the public schools 'without prejudice or prefer-
ence for any class, sect, or creed, and without largesses from the Treasury to
any.' A joint resolution to this effect, introduced into the House of Representa-
tives by Hon. James G. Blaine, was adopted in that body by an almost unani-
mous vote. Amended in the Senate by the addition of a proviso that it should
not be construed against the reading of the Bible in the schools, it was adopted
there by a vote of 28 to 16, or a little less than the requisite two-thirds. The
danger is now more manifest, the need is more urgent than then. The lapse of
a dozen years has strengthened every argument which was then employed in
support of this measure.
At a largely attended public meeting, the call for which was signed by a
large number of the leading citizens of Philadelphia, the undersigned were
appointed a committee to act for their fellow-citizens in this matter. In sup-
port, therefore, of the desired action we lay before you this memorial, and beg
leave also to submit the resolutions adopted at the aforesaid meeting, which
are as follows:
Resolved, That this nation, in its origin and history, is Christian.
Our colonial compacts of government and charters, our State consti-
tutions and statutes, our common law, our days of fasting and
thanksgiving, our State and national institutions and usages gener-
ally, have given our political being a marked and distinctive Chris-
tian character.
Resolved, That the type of Christianity which has characterized
our State and national life is that which secures to our people an
open Bible, the right of private judgment, freedom of speech and of
the press, and the entire independence of our Government against all
foreign domination, whether ecclesiastical or civil. The sovereign
people and their government are not amenable to spiritual pontiffs
or civil potentates, but to God and His law.
Resolved, That our common schools, as one of the most impor-
tant institutions of our country, should correspond to the Christian
origin, history, and character of the Republic itself. Our schools
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should teach the history of our country and the character of our
institutions; our laws, and the reasons for them; the prerogatives and
responsibilities of the sovereign people and their government, and
the loyality [sic] due, under God, to the authority of our own rulers.
The Bible ought not only to be read, but taught, in all the schools.
The public schools must prove a failure if they do not train our rising
generation to be honest, virtuous, and loyal citizens. Such training, as
the ordinance for the Territory of the Northwest and Washington's
Farewell Address assure us, can be found only in the principles of
religion.
Resolved, That while our schools are and should be Christian, no
preference or advantage should be given to any one sect or denomi-
nation in connection with the public schools. Above all, no sect can
justly or fairly claim any portion of the public money for the support
of its own sectarian schools.
Resolved, That in both these respects our school system should
be kept on the foundations on which it was placed by our fathers.
We seek no change, and we will withstand all attempts to revolution-
ize, in either of these features, our system of public education.
Resolved, That we approve of the general features of the consti-
tutional amendment now pending in the Senate of the United States,
"respecting establishments of religion and free public schools," in
that, while it recognizes the Christian character and purpose of our
system of education, it forbids the appropriation of public money to
any school in which the peculiar tenets or ceremonials of any reli-
gious sect or denomination are practiced or taught.
Resolved, That a committee of nine be appointed by this meet-
ing to co-operate with the National Reform Association in its further
efforts in behalf of this or any similar measure which may be
directed to the same ends, and that this committee shall have power
to add to its numbers.
Then follow the signatures of a large number of the leading citizens of the
city of Philadelphia. The constitutional amendment referred to is in these
words:
Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of
the United States respecting establishments of religion and free pub-
lic schools.
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of the
House concurring therein), That the following amendment to the
Constitution of the United States be, and hereby is proposed to the
States, to become valid when ratified by the Legislatures of three-
fourths of the States as provided in the Constitution:
Article -
SEC. 1. No State shall ever make or maintain any law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise therof.
SEC. 2. Each State in this Union shall establish and maintain a
system of free public schools adequate for the education of all the
children living therein, between the ages of six and sixteen years,
inclusive, in the common branches of knowledge, and in virtue,
morality, and the principles of the Christian religion. But no money
raised by taxation imposed by law or any money or other property or
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frage, the
conference committee [has] embodied in this great enabling
act, . . . the very essence of the provision in the constitutional
amendment which I have just read, [the Blaine amendment, as
modified by the Senate] and this feature I most highly com-
mend and I shall look to it in the struggles of the future.
127
credit belonging to any municipal organization, or to any State, or to
the United States, shall ever be appropriated, applied, or given to
the use of purposes of any school, institution, corporation, or person,
whereby instruction or training shall be given in the doctrines, ten-
ets, belief, ceremonials, or observances peculiar to any sect, denomi-
nation, organization, or society, being, or claiming to be, religious in
its character, nor shall such peculiar doctrines, tenets, belief, ceremo-
nials, or observances, be taught or inculcated in the free public
schools.
SEC. 3. To the end that each State, the United States, and all
the people thereof, may have and preserve governments republican
in form and in substance, the United States shall guaranty to every
State, and to the people of every State and of the United States, the
support and maintenance of such a system of free public schools as is
herein provided.
SEC. 4. That Congress shall enforce this article by legislation
when necessary.
Mr. President, the conference committee have embodied in this great ena-
bling act, so defective with reference to one-half of the population living within
the Territory concerned; so defective, I had almost said, in the light of the
times in which we live; so wickedly defective in that regard, the committee
have embodied in this great bill a provision substantially the same, the very
essence of the provision in the constitutional amendment which I have just
read, and this feature I most highly commend and I shall look to it in the
struggles of the future, if I participate in them, as the great precedent for the
general adoption of the substance of the constitutional amendment which has
been proposed, is now pending before us, and which I have just read to the
Senate.
I am not one of those who think these States should have been admitted
at this time under these circumstances; I gladly defer to the judgment of those
who, in so much greater numbers, are individually quite my peers upon a ques-
tion of this kind. But I should have preferred that we should have taken a little
more time, that we should have given to these separate Territories a little more
of individual consideration, and that in this great act we should have done
much more of justice and should have placed these coming States upon a foun-
dation of enduring prosperity and of stable institutions, republican in form,
working justice to everybody, regardless of sex. I should, I say, have preferred
this could I have had my own judgment complied with, and I should defeat
this bill for six months or a year if we could achieve these grand results. But,
sir, the majority rules, and I bow to the majority, specifying the reasons why I
should have been glad that while doing so much of justice that we might have
done more.
I will no longer claim the attention of the Senate.
20 CONG. REc. 2100-01 (1889).
127. Id. at 2101.
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The thrust of the enabling act and its history was that pro-
posed states could not gain admission to the Union unless the
people adopted a Blaine amendment in their proposed constitu-
tions that would outlaw any form of public assistance to schools
under sectarian control or influence. A brief look at the Wash-
ington State Constitution illustrates the consequences of such a
demand.
Three different provisions in the state constitution set out
the basic law on state and religion:
Article I, Section 11. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious
sentiment, belief and worship, shall be guaranteed to every
individual, and no one shall be molested or disturbed in person
or property on account of religion; but the liberty of conscience
hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of
licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace
and safety of the state. No public money or property shall be
appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise
or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment:
Provided however, That this article shall not be so construed
as to forbid the employment by the state of a chaplain for such
of the state custodial, correctional and mental institutions as in
the discretion of the legislature may seem justified. No reli-
gious qualification shall be required for any public office or
employment, nor shall any person be incompetent as a witness
or juror, in consequence of his opinion on matters of religion,
nor be questioned in any court of justice touching his religious
belief to affect the weight of his testimony.2
Article IX, Section 4. SECTARIAN CONTROL OR INFLU-
ENCE PROHIBITED
All schools maintained or supported wholly or in part by
the public funds shall be forever free from sectarian control or
influence.'29
128. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11 (1889, amended 1904, 1957). The present text of the
religion clause (art. I, § 11) follows the language of amend. 34 (S.J. Res. 14, 35th Leg.,
1957 Wash. Laws 1299). This article is substantially identical to the original text. In
1904, however, the following sentence was inserted: "Provided however, That this article
shall not be so construed as to forbid the employment by the State of a chaplain for the
State penitentiary, and for such of the State reformatories as in the discretion of the
Legislature may seem justified." S.B. 142, 8th Leg., 1903 Wash. Laws 283 (amended
1957).
The 1957 amend. 34 expanded the language to its present form and included "state
custodial, correctional and mental institutions." WASH. CONST. amend. 34.
129. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 4.
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Article XXVI provides in part:
Fourth. Provision shall be made for the establishment
and maintenance of systems of public schools free from secta-
rian control which shall be open to all the children of said
state.'°
It is not remarkable that the constitutional provisions so
carefully reflect the enabling act. The drafters undoubtedly
understood that, realistically, there was no choice. What is
remarkable, however, is that the provisions reflect the greater
debate that we have demonstrated, which had shaped the con-
gressional motivation to make the demands made in the ena-
bling act. Where the drafters of the Washington Constitution
had a choice, the debate was vigorous.
A. Tax Exemption of Church Property
One issue that received serious consideration during the
Washington Constitutional Convention was the tax status of
church property. One faction sought to include a provision in
the new constitution that exempted ecclesiastical property from
taxation; their opponents favored a provision requiring that
churches be taxed. The compromise that the convention adopted
was silence, a solution that leaves the issue up to the legislature.
The Tacoma Morning Globe for August 8, 1889, told the story in
elegant style.1 3 1
130. WASH. CONST. art. XXVI. Comparable state constitutional provisions are found
in N.M. CONST. art. XII, §§ 1-4 (§ 1, 1911, amended 1953); N.D. CONST. art. XIII, § 1
(1889, amended 1958); S.D. CONST. art. 22.
131. Tacoma Morning Globe, Aug. 8, 1889, at 1, col. 1.
Exemption of Church Property
The question of exempting church property from taxation found little
favor. Cosgrove was the only one who made any effort in behalf of the
churches. The majority considered that the committee had struck a happy
medium by giving the legislature the power to pass exemption laws. It was the
general opinion, however, that churches should pay a proper share of the taxes.
Godman argued if churches were exempted it would violate a great princi-
ple. It would unite church and state. To exempt churches would simply be a
contribution by the state to the church of the amount of the taxes. If the mat-
ter was left to the people it would be defeated, as it was before, two to one. "If
you unite church and state, goodbye to civil government. It is dangerous and
pernicious," he said.
All this opposition was aroused by an amendment offered by Comegys that
churches should be exempted to the extent of $1,000, which Judge Hoyt
amended by making it $5,000. This found stray advocates in Dyer, Griffitts,
and Warner; Buchanan and Stiles were opposed to any limits. If the principle
of exempting or taxing church property was right then the limit was wrong.
[Vol. 8:411
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The compromise survives today in the language of article
Stiles said he had a petition signed by 185 persons, among them leading
businessmen of Tacoma, and one of the ablest clergymen he had ever heard
preach, Rev. W.E. Copeland, protesting against the exemption of church
property.
Both amendments were lost, and in order to get the sense of the conven-
tion whether it was in favor of taxing or exempting church property, Godman
moved that his minority report against exempting be substituted for a majority
report, which was lost.
It was interesting to note that pious interest displayed by some of the
statesmen who needed the support of the faithful at the coming election. Some
of them betrayed the ranked demagogy by offering amendments to exempt the
property of the poor widow, the lone orphan and the toiling mechanic. One
man went so far as to draw a distinction between taxing the rich man and the
poor man. Another feeling referred to the struggling widow who was compelled
to sell her washing and her sewing machines to meet relentless demands of the
hated tax collector.
Amendment after amendment was offered and after three hours of incuba-
tion the following was hatched out to be known as section 4, leaving the ques-
tion of taxing church property to the legislature. The property of the United
States and of state, counties, school districts and other municipal corporations
and such other property as the legislature may by general law provide, shall be
exempt from taxation.
The remainder of the article as published in the Globe yesterday, except
sections 5, 8, and 13, which were stricken out, was adopted.
On motion of Gowey section 1 was amended as follows: "The legislature
shall provide by law for an annual tax sufficient with other sources of revenue
to defray the estimated ordinary expenses of the state for each fiscal year."
When the article was presented to the convention for concurrence in the
amendments Judge Turner said he hoped section 4 would not be agreed to.
Aside from leaving the question of taxing church property to the legislature it
gave that body too much scope in regard to exempting other property. The
section was however, retained by the following vote, which shows that the
members stand two to one against the constitutional exemption of church
property.
Ayes-Blalock, Buchanan, Burk, Coey, Cosgrove, Dickey, Dunbar, Durie,
Dyer, Eldridge, Eshelman, Fay, Glascock, Griffitts, Henry, Jamison, Jones, Jay,
Kellogg, Kinnear, Lillis, Lindsley, McCroskey, McElroy, McReavy, Minor,
Moore, J.Z. (Spokane), Morgans, Newton, Power, Prosser, Reed, T.M. (Thur-
ston), Reed, J.M. (Whitman), Schooley, Shoudy, Sohns, Stiles, Tibbetts, Weir,
Weisenberger, West Winsor; total, 43.
Nays-Berry, Bowen, Clothier, Comegys, Crowley, Godman, Gowey, Gray,
Hicks, Manley, McDonald, More, R.S. (Pierce), Neace, Sharpstein, Stevenson,
Sturdevant, Suksdorf, Sullivan, E.H. (Whitman), Turner, VanName, Warner,
Willison, President Hoyt. Noes-22.
Absent-Allen, Browne, Dallam, Fairweather, Hayton, Hungate, Jeffs,
Mires, Sullivan, P.C. (Pierce), Travis, 10.
A half dozen amendments in various forms, all in favor of exempting
church property to a certain extent, were promptly voted down, together with
several others to other sections. The article was next placed on final passage
and adopted by a vote of 41 to 17.
This is the eighth article which the convention has adopted.
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VII, section 1, which provides: "Such property as the legislature
may by general laws provide shall be exempt from taxation."
The constitutionality of this provision under the federal Consti-
tution was determined in Walz v. Tax Commission,'132 in which
the Court held that Congress and the states may exempt reli-
gious property from general real estate taxes without running
afoul of the establishment clause. The recent decision in Mueller
v. Allen,1 3 however, upholding the right of the State of Minne-
sota to permit certain income tax deductions of amounts spent
for tuition and transportation of students, may fall into the
Everson category of actions permitted in the United States but
not in the State of Washington, if (or when) Washington enacts
a state income tax.
B. Free Exercise of Religion and Disestablishmentarianism
The full implications of the Reynolds test for freedom of
religion cannot be appreciated without a slight digression into
the realm of freedom of speech. One of the most significant deci-
sions for an understanding of the development of the constitu-
tional doctrines of freedom of speech and freedom of the press
was Fox v. Washington.134 Fox was a Tacoma newspaper editor
who had been prosecuted because his statements tended to bring
the law into disrespect. Following the San Francisco fire, many
people sought salvation by fleeing from California to the Pacific
Northwest, where many of them gravitated into a variety of
communes.
One of these groups, known as Homeites, was the subject of
Fox's article "The Nude and the Prudes," in which Fox pointed
out that the Homeites bathed sometimes in evening dress and
sometimes in the clothes that nature gave them. Unfortunately,
this idyllic existence was interrupted when a dispute broke out
within the group and some of the dissidents reported the shock-
ing conduct to the authorities. As a result, the joint was raided
and the nudists were properly apprehended and prosecuted.
Fox ran afoul of the law because, when he described the
untoward events that resulted in the suppression of nudity, he
editorialized that the force of the law was brought down upon
this community by a few prudes who proceeded in a brutal and
132. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
133. 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
134. 236 U.S. 273 (1915).
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unneighborly way to blow the whistle. Fox thought that his com-
ment on the evidence was protected by the first amendment, but
the United States Supreme Court was quick to point out in pure
Blackstonian logic that even if freedom of speech and of the
press were liberties protected by the fourteenth amendment,
Fox's conduct was not within the parameters of protected
speech. 135
The glory of English liberty, as extolled by Blackstone, was
that there could be no prior restraint. But the English law of
seditious libel stood clear: God help the person who said the
wrong thing. The "wrong thing" was anything treasonable, sedi-
tious, or (as in Washington) tending to bring the law into disre-
pute. All that the prosecution must establish, according to the
Court in Fox, is that the speech complained of has a dangerous
tendency. Thus, what the speaker said or intended is irrele-
vant-the test is what someone might do if he or she believed
the speaker. As applied to Fox: if people read his complaint
about the stoolies and believed that it was unneighborly to
squeal, this could undermine law enforcement that is so criti-
cally dependent upon informants.
But if Fox is not appreciated, it is easy to miss the point in
United States v. Schenk,'13 Abrams v. United States,'37 and
Gitlow v. New York' 38 that what the defendant said is irrelevant
because the constitutional test is what might happen if, for
example, young men believed that the Draft Act violated the
thirteenth amendment. Similarly, the theme of guilt by associa-
tion, which is the hallmark of Whitney v. California,'3" is a reit-
eration of the doctrine that the Court had endorsed against the
Mormons in Davis v. Beason.40
This brief digression into the free speech area helps to eluci-
date the free exercise issues. Curiously, the tremendous evolu-
tion in the scope of protected speech, culminating in such cases
as Brandenburg v. Ohio,"' which places the constitutional line
of demarcation protecting communication at the point of incite-
ment to imminent lawless action, and Law Students Civil Rights
135. Id. at 277.
136. 249 U.S. 48 (1919).
137. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
138. 268 U.S. 652 (1923).
139. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
140. 133 U.S. 333 (1890). See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
141. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
446 University of Puget Sound Law Review
Research Council v. Wadmond,"2 which stands for the proposi-
tion that membership may not be punished unless the govern-
ment proves that the membership was knowing and with the
specific intent to further illegal aims, has not been accompanied
by a comparable doctrinal development in the free exercise area.
The United States Supreme Court has indeed articulated an
occasional viewpoint that cannot be reconciled with the plain
language of Reynolds. For example, in Sherbert v. Verner,"3 the
Court indicated that a compelling state interest must be found
to justify the state's decision to impose a substantial burden
upon a citizen by requiring the citizen either to work on Satur-
day or to forgo unemployment compensation. In Wisconsin v.
Yoder,"' the Court indicated that a state must demonstrate an
interest of sufficient magnitude to override the religious interest
claiming protection under the free exercise clause. Only those
state interests of the highest order that are not otherwise served
can outweigh an identifiable religious sect's legitimate claims to
the free exercise of religion.
In Gillette v. United States,' 5 however, virtually the same
Court held that Congress could constitutionally compel a selec-
tive conscientious objector to bear arms in a war that his religion
taught him was "unjust." The Court stated that to invalidate a
religious claim, the government need only show that a "substan-
tial government interest" will be adversely affected." 6
The purpose of this dissertation is not to do the impossible
by reconciling Reynolds, Sherbert, and Gillette. The basic prob-
lem with the Reynolds approach is that under Reynolds, free-
dom of religion means that one can believe anything; if others do
not like that belief, however, one cannot practice it. In all of the
often heated congressional debates about Mormonism, no one
sought to prove that polygamy was a social evil in any sense of
the word. Instead, proponents relied upon interminable scrip-
tural citations to show that polygamy was sinful. Toward the
end of the debates, it is true, the social argument was voiced
that the true evil of polygamy was that a man would not provide
for his wives in their declining years and the wives would
become public charges. This was a type of Catch-22 argument
142. 401 U.S. 154 (1971).
143. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
144. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
145. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
146. Id. at 454-60.
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because the empirical evidence upon which it rested was simply
that Mormons were threatened with imprisonment for unlawful
"cohabitation" if they so much as contacted more than one
female, let alone provided sustenance for more than one.
The Mormon story does illustrate the oft-repeated theory
that the Constitution is only a scrap of paper, and that if a true
majority wishes to compel a minority to alter its religious beliefs,
nothing in our governmental system prevents the majority from
having its way. An early Washington case, State v. Neitzel,14 7
quoted Reynolds and upheld the prosecution of a fortuneteller
on the ground that any religious "practice" may be outlawed.
The early laws against fortunetellers and soothsayers were
purely religious in character because the established church in
England sought to eliminate these false religious practices. To
many a devout voter, the possible danger from permitting for-
tunetelling-for example, fraud or devil worship-justified the
banishment of this false religion.
In a slightly different vein, the Washington Supreme Court
adopted a less restrictive test for free exercise of religion in
State ex rel. Holcomb v. Armstrong.1 48 In Armstrong, the court
stated that religious freedom to act can be restricted only to pre-
vent grave and immediate danger to interests that the state may
lawfully protect. 149 In Armstrong, a student had objected on reli-
gious grounds to an x-ray examination required by the Univer-
sity of Washington. However, the test enunciated is vastly dif-
ferent from Reynolds.
More recently, in City of Sumner v. First Baptist
Church,50 a plurality of the court endorsed a two-pronged test
that would require the court to determine first whether the mag-
nitude of the governmental interest outweighs the first amend-
ment values and, if so, whether the means chosen to enforce the
governmental interest are the least restrictive necessary. First
Baptist Church involved the validity of a city ordinance that, as
applied, prevented the use of a church building as a parochial
school. Of interest was Judge Dolliver's dissent, in which he
stated that the zoning statute was "presumed constitutional,"'51
an approach that is incorporated in the minimum scrutiny tests
147. 69 Wash. 567, 569, 125 P. 939, 940 (1912).
148. 39 Wash. 2d 860, 239 P.2d 545 (1952).
149. Id. at 864, 239 P.2d at 548.
150. 97 Wash. 2d 1, 639 P.2d 1358 (1982).
151. Id. at 19, 639 P.2d at 1368.
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traditionally applied to economic regulation and other exercises
of the police power in an equal protection context.'52
The deep divergence in philosophical views that underlies
the confusing and contradictory cases involving free exercise of
religion rarely surfaces in plain language. Instead, it is most
commonly evidenced by the summary disposition of a case, more
by reference to the respectability of the religious group involved
than by reference to any coherent principle. Thus, for example,
in United States v. Kuch, 53 the court summarily dismissed the
religious claims of the chief boo hoo of the Neo-American
Church and upheld the seven-count conviction for possession of
marijuana and LSD. The court expressed its displeasure with
the "nihilistic, agnostic, and anti-establishment attitude" evi-
denced in such sacramental appendages as the church seal, with
the motto: "Victory over Horseshit.' 1 54 In the course of his opin-
ion, Judge Gesell pines for the simpler days of the Reynolds test,
which articulated the "pristine view taken by our founding
fathers":' 55
Unfortunately we have been gradually drifting from this
pristine view taken by our founding fathers that religious
beliefs were to be upheld at all costs but that acts induced by
religious beliefs could be prohibited where Congress spoke in
the interests of society as a whole. Recent decisions of the
Supreme Court [Sherbert v. Verner] suggest that there must
be a balancing of the legislative end to be achieved against the
effect of the legislation on practices . . . of a particular religion
. . . .No United States District Judge who must act within the
confines of a record and available judicial time has the wisdom
or means of doing adequately what the cases appear to
require.1 56
An intermediate, but nonetheless curious view was
expressed by the Tenth Circuit in Williams v. Eaton.15 7 In Wil-
liams, the court validated the expulsion of several black athletes
from the University of Wyoming because these athletes insisted
upon wearing black armbands when competing against teams
from Brigham Young. The purpose of the black armbands was
152. See Lindsley v. National Carbolic Gas, 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
153. 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968).
154. Id. at 445.
155. Id. at 446.
156. Id.
157. 468 F.2d 1079 (10th Cir. 1972).
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to protest the racial policies of the latter institution. The court
held, however, that it was permissible for state institutions to
punish severely anyone who disparaged another religion. 158
To underscore the implications of Williams, one should
reflect for a moment upon Calvary Bible Presbyterian Church v.
Board of Regents, 59 in which the Supreme Court of Washington
held that it was constitutionally permissible to teach the "lib-
eral" view of scriptural authenticity: Moses did not author the
Pentateuch; Isaiah did not author the Book of Isaiah; David did
not author the Psalms; the story of Adam and Eve is a myth.
The court reasoned that open, critical, and scholarly examina-
tion of the literature (even if somewhat one-sided) does not con-
stitute expending public funds for religious purposes.16
The black athletes in Williams could be punished because
their devoutly held religious belief that they were not cursed and
inferior persons must never be expressed in such a way as to
disparage their antagonists. This is pure Reynolds. A pari, reli-
gious indoctrination and inculcation can be subsidized by taxes
in Washington State, despite the vehement protest of funda-
mentalists, as long as the teaching is done in a suave, urbane,
and sophisticated manner. This is equally pure Reynolds: you
can believe whatever you want, but if the "liberal" view rates
higher in the state academic hierarchy, your personal beliefs are
de minimis.
The true meaning of Reynolds is a political-religious one
that is hinted at in Justice Waite's opinion for the Court. One
recurring theme throughout the congressional debates was that
the "real" problem with Mormonism was not polygamy itself but
the theocratic nature of the Mormon political institutions. For
example, Senator Bayard of Delaware declared:
The government of Utah today has no semblance to
republican government .... All that was intended to be con-
served of republican institutions and theory has been displaced
by a system of theocracy. And therefore, for the purpose of
obtaining the spirit and meaning and principle of republican
government it is necessary that theocracy shall be displaced.''
Finally, perhaps the case that best illustrates the depen-
158. Id. at 1083.
159. 72 Wash. 2d 912, 921, 436 P.2d 189, 194 (1967).
160. Id. at 919-22, 436 P.2d at 193-95.
161. 47th Cong., 1st Sess., 13 CONG. REC. 1156 (1882).
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dence of the constitutional test upon the religion being chal-
lenged is Leary v. United States."2 Timothy Leary challenged
his conviction for illegally importing marijuana on the grounds
that marijuana plays a vital part in the rituals of the Hindu sect
of which he was a member. The Court summarily announced:
Appellant's reliance on Sherbert v. Verner, [374 U.S. 398
(1963)] for authority that the constitutionally guaranteed right
of free religious exercise imposes on the Government the bur-
den of showing a compelling interest in its abridgment, is mis-
placed and inapposite on the facts ....
Here the paramount Government interest in the enforce-
ment of the laws relative to marijuana is the protection of soci-
ety. We cannot reasonably equate deliberate violation of fed-
eral marijuana laws with the refusal of an individual to work
on her Sabbath Day and nevertheless claim compensation
benefits. 163
Rather than focus upon the disparity of treatment that is
accorded different or unconventional religious beliefs, the Court
has drawn a line of demarcation between government action that
orders a person to do something that violates his or her religious
belief and government prohibition of some action that may have
religious connotations for a citizen. Thus, in the flag salute case,
Board of Education v. Barnett,'6 the Court upheld the right of
Jehovah Witnesses' children to refuse to salute the flag. In
sweeping language, the Court said: "If there is any fixed star in
our constitutional constellation it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, national-
ism, religion or other matters of opinion or force citizens to con-
fess by word or act their faith therein."""6
Whatever that oft-quoted statement of public policy may
have meant to the Court, it was of little avail to Ms. Struck, an
officer in the United States Air Force who ran afoul of Air Force
Regulation 36-12, which required the immediate termination of
any officer who has given birth to a living child while in a com-
missioned officer status.166 Ms. Struck was given the choice of
162. 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
163. Id. at 860.
164. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
165. Id. at 642.
166. Struck v. Secretary of Defense, 460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir.) (judgment vacated and
case remanded to consider mootness in light of government's change of position),
vacated, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972).
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either obtaining an abortion, in violation of her Roman Catholic
religious beliefs, or terminating her commission. The Ninth Cir-
cuit made a brief concession to the religious issue and concluded
that the administrative convenience of uniformity in military
regulations outweighed any inconvenience to Ms. Struck."6 7
Perhaps the issue can be more artfully focused by a hypo-
thetical illustration. Section 49.12.200 of the Revised Code of
Washington provides:
Women may pursue any calling open to men . . . [and]
hereafter in this state every avenue of employment shall be
open to women; and any business, vocation, profession and
calling followed and pursued by men may be followed and pur-
sued by women, and no person shall be disqualified from
engaging in or pursuing any business, vocation, profession, call-
ing or employment or excluded from any premises or place of
work or employment on account of sex.'6"
Section 49.12.170 probably makes the violation of the above
statute a misdemeanor, and we shall assume for the sake of
argument that it does. Thus, our scenario unfolds with a Roman
Catholic Bishop being prosecuted because he refuses to ordain a
woman.
Under Reynolds, the only question is the amount of the fine
to be imposed, from twenty-five dollars to one thousand dollars,
because RCW 49.12.170 does not provide for a prison term.
Under Sherbert and its progeny, there will be some burden upon
the state to demonstrate either a compelling state interest or, at
the least, a substantial state interest justifying this infringement
of religious liberty.
Since the voters of Washington enacted the equal rights
amendment,6 9 the articulated public policy of Washington
would seem to favor the prosecution. Obviously, any "extra pro-
tection" afforded by the language of the Washington constitu-
tional provision for free exercise of religion is negated insofar as
it conflicts with the subsequently enacted ERA. In this sense it
probably does not matter which test one adopts, since the result
will be the same. At least a high probability exists that all the
tests will converge upon the same result. There is, however,
another factor. The defendant is not a member of just any reli-
167. Id. at 1376-77.
168. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.12.200 (1983).
169. WASH. CONST. art. XXXI.
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gion, but belongs to a long-established, respected, and well-rec-
ognized religion. The religious tenet of the defendant is probably
more outcome-determinative than all of the "tests" laid end to
end.
This example suggests that the main reason it is impossible
to reconcile the divergent constitutional analyses of the "free-
dom of religion" article is that it is virtually impossible to know
the depth and sincerity of religious or philosophical conviction
that motivates or motivated the authors. In the best of all possi-
ble worlds, it might be possible to dissect these traumatic reli-
gious convictions objectively and dispassionately. This cannot be
done, however, in a world in which the court follows the election
returns.
This evanescent complexity of religious problems in the law
is only hinted at in a recent, truly Delphic, pronouncement of
the Washington Supreme Court. In Lund v. Caple,'170 the court
held that an aggrieved husband could not sue a pastor (and the
church) for damages resulting from the pastor's sexual miscon-
duct with his wife, who had gone to the pastor for counseling.
The court held that this was simply too close to "alienation of
affections," 17' a cause of action that had been abolished in
Wyman v. Wallace. 72 The opinion, however, does not stop at
that point. The court adds:
This opinion, however, should not be read as precluding an
action against a counselor, pastoral or otherwise, in which a
counselor is negligent in treating either a husband or wife. It is
conceivable that a malpractice action would be appropriate
where a counselor fails to conform to an appropriate standard
of care .... 173
If a pastor is liable for negligent performance of his counseling
function, will he be financially liable for inflicting economic
harm because he pronounced a sentence of excommunication?
The doctrinaire analysis of the establishment clause that under-
lies Weiss and its predecessors would impose liability. The free
speech and free exercise language of our state and federal consti-
tutions may impose a different result. A famous case and the
170. 100 Wash. 2d 739, 746-47, 675 P.2d 226, 231 (1984).
171. Id.
172. 94 Wash. 2d 99, 615 P.2d 452 (1980).
173. 100 Wash. 2d at 747, 675 P.2d at 231.
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viewpoints that it elicited aptly illustrate this topic.174
VI. LABADIE V. RICHARD
Father Gabriel Richard holds a notable place in American
history, quite apart from his involvement in this particular type
of problem. In addition to being cofounder of the University of
Michigan, Father Richard was the first Roman Catholic priest
ever elected to serve in the United States Congress (delegate
from Michigan Territory, 1823). For purposes of brevity, it
seems best to narrate the events in Labadie v. Richard in chron-
ological order.
1816: Father Richard pronounced sentence of excommuni-
cation against Francois Labadie. From the documentation set
forth below, it seems clear that Labadie was declared vitandus
(to be shunned)-which meant that no Catholic could have
social or civil dealings with him, under pain of ipso facto excom-
munication. This drastic penalty was imposed upon Labadie for
entering a civil marriage after divorce from his first wife.
1817: A trial court in Michigan Territory held that Father
Richard was guilty of defamation and awarded Labadie $1,116
in damages.
1823: Father Richard was elected as Michigan Territorial
Delegate to the United States Congress. The unpaid judgment
became a political football. The case was reargued on appeal in
November of 1823, but the court was deadlocked and postponed
making a decision.
1824: Father Richard was imprisoned under writ of body
execution. He was released on bond and, despite the bond's limi-
tation that he could not depart from Wayne County, his right to
attend Congress under privilege of immunity accorded congres-
sional delegates was eventually upheld in the territorial courts.
1825: Defeated for re-election as territorial delegate (also
in 1827 and 1829).
1831: Writ of certiorari granted in the original defamation
proceeding by the United States Supreme Court (January 10,
1831).
1834: Writ of certiorari dismissed by the United States
Supreme Court. (Father Richard had died on September 13,
1832.) The writ seems to have been dismissed, however, because
174. See infra notes 175-93 and accompanying text.
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no one would post bond at triple the amount in question (a
supersedeas bond) in the United States Supreme Court.
1835: Assignees of the Labadie claim moved for execution
on the 1817 judgment. 175
There does not seem to be any question that Father Rich-
ard vehemently denounced Labadie. One account of the event,
narrated in his biography, states: "He cursed Labadie when he
was awake and asleep; when he was well and when he was ill;
lying down or standing up; feasting or fasting; cursed his head,
body and soul; and condemned him to hell everlasting.' 1 76 There
may be less certitude about whether Labadie was declared
vitandus, but the available evidence certainly points in that
direction. 77 The biographers state that Father Richard first
obtained the permission of Bishop Flaget of Bardstown, his
superior, and actually issued the excommunication under direc-
tions from the higher prelate. 78 Moreover, in the averments in
the records of the trial, Labadie states that in a private conver-
sation with one John S. Roby, Father Richard said: "Mr.
Labadie is an adulterer. . . . I have given notice in church and
I shall excommunicate him . . . . I have forbidden the French
people from trading with or speaking to him, and unless he will
put away the woman he calls his wife I will ruin him."' 7 e The
defendant denied all these averments of the plaintiff, but that
may have been a tactical maneuver.180
Whether or not the sentence of vitandus was actually pro-
nounced, the excommunication undoubtedly had that effect.
Father Richard probably intended to injure Labadie in the lat-
175. The events outlined above will be found described in detail in F. WOODFORD &
A. HYMA, GABRIEL RICHARD: FRONTIER AMBASSADOR 120-22, 130-31 (1958). The court
records, sometimes in fragmentary form, may be found in 2 TRANSACTIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN, 1805-1836, at 598 (W. Blume ed. 1935-
40) [hereinafter cited as TRANSACTIONS]. The opinion on Father Richard's right to leave
Michigan to attend Congress will be found in 1 TRANSACTIONS, supra this note, at 474.
The papers relative to proceedings in the United States Supreme Court are in 1 TRANS-
ACTIONS, supra this note, at 462, 472. The final judgment is in 2 TRANSACTIONS, supra
this note, at 365.
176. F. WOODFORD & A. HYMA, supra note 175, at 121.
177. Id. at 120.
178. 1 TRANSACTIONS, supra note 175, at 600.
179. Id. at 603. A difficulty parallel to the jury problem in the Hasset case is listed
by Father Richard among the grounds for a new trial: The jury at the original trial was
composed of "eleven Protestants and one Catholic"-in other words, Catholics had been
systematically excluded in the selection of the jury. Of course, Labadie would argue that
they should have been.
180. Id.
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ter's business dealings, in the hope that such temporal depriva-
tion would cause him to mend his ways.
When Father Richard went to Washington, D.C., he took
along an opinion of his friend on the Michigan Territorial Court,
Judge Woodward, which stated that the priest had "meant only
to impute to the plaintiff that which the Roman Church consid-
ers an offense and not that which the municipal law regards as
such." 181 While in Washington, Father Richard showed this
opinion to his intimate friends, including Henry Clay, Daniel
Webster, and others. Since their opinions on this matter have
never before been printed, they will be included here in full:
Sir:
We have examined your statement, and consider the opinion of
Judge Woodward which you have submitted to us. Our opinion
is
First: That if a general verdict be rendered for the Plain-
tiff on a Declaration containing more than one count, and
one of the counts be bad, the judgment must be arrested.
Second: Words, in themselves actionable may neverthe-
less be spoken under such circumstances and in such con-
nection as that they thereby cease to be actionable; and if
in this case it sufficiently appear that the Defendant
meant only to impute to the Plaintiff that which the
Roman Church considers as an offense and not that which
the municipal Law regards as such, no action will lie for
such words.
We may add that there are many cases in which words are spo-
ken before Ecclesiastical Jurisdictions, or in the exercise of
ecclesiastical discipline, which can not be made the subject of a
suit for slander altho they might be actionable if spoken with-
out such causes or occasion, and maliciously. But the chief
ground of our opinion in this case is that the words under the
circumstances given the connection'8 in which they appear to
have been spoken do not charge any offense punishable by the





John Scott of Bait
181. Id. at 604.
182. This portion of the letter in italics is badly faded.
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Peter S. Da Ponceau of Philadpa.
I concur in the above opinion. H. Clay.
Hon. Gabriel Richard:
I have examined the opinion of Judge Woodward referred
to above, and upon the statement contained in it, entirely
concur in his view of the law.
Hon. Horace Binney
I have read the opinion of Judge Woodward and the words
charged to have been slanderously spoken of Francois Labadie
by the Reverend Gabriel Richard. These words spoken in the
course of church discipline and expressive of a positive dogma
of the Catholic Church cannot support an action of slander
against the clergyman who uttered them in the course and
exercise of his professional duties. Where one count is bad and
the verdict is general the judgment must be arrested.
Having seen the declaration in the cause above referred to, I
see no reason to alter my opinion. The term Excommunication
has a meaning determinal and the plaintiff's own innuendo
that the defendant spoke and acted as a priest explained it so
fully that I cannot see how any temporal judge can award judg-
ment of execution against a Catholic priest to whom that
power is delegated, without violating the most fundamental
principle of the constitution which provides against all reli-
gious interference and [leaves]' 8 3 every religious communion8 4
free to exercise the natural right of preserving its own purity
by its own appropriate modes of government and discipline.
William Sampson
New York 19 Nov. 1824.2"5
183. This word is completely illegible in the original manuscript.
184. This word is almost illegible in the original manuscript.
185. The original letter is preserved in the Detroit Chancery Archives (DCA-I-55). I
am indebted to Msgr. Edward Hickey of Detroit for this reference and the opportunity
to examine the manuscript.
Edward Livingston (1764-1836) was a famous jurist. His revised system of penal law,
which he wrote into the Criminal Code of Louisiana, is a landmark in American jurispru-
dence. John W. Taylor (1784-1854) was Speaker of the House during the 16th Congress,
2d Session, and is best remembered for his part in the passage of the Missouri Compro-
mise. John Scott of Baltimore and Peter S. Da Ponceau were capable attorneys but have
no historical claims comparable to the other signatories.
Horace Binney was a famous lawyer from Philadelphia. He had been deeply
involved in the struggle with Andrew Jackson over the United States Bank before com-
ing to Congress. He argued and won the Girard will case against Daniel Webster in the
Supreme Court. It is reported that he twice turned down a seat on the United States
Supreme Court because he preferred to continue practicing law.
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Daniel Webster and Henry Clay certainly rank among the
most outstanding American jurists in the history of the Repub-
lic. Their flexible and accommodating philosophy of the first
amendment contrasts starkly with the rigid doctrinairism that
permeated the Grant Administration and, through the Blaine
amendment, infects the current Washington State debate on
these issues. Clay and Webster reflected and accurately articu-
lated an earlier, more accommodating national concensus, which
predates the rise of the Vicious anti-Catholicism that marked the
Blaine era. In the present age, the effect of that animus survives
in the form of a rigid separationist philosophy. The Washington
court continues to foster a high wall of separation between
church and state-a structure that conserves judicial energy by
short-circuiting rational analysis through the ritualistic invoca-
tion of platitudinous precedents. Yet, the preceding analysis
suggests that there is more on heaven and on earth than is
dreamt of by this philosophy.
VII. FINAL REFLECTIONS
We turn to a summary of the language in the Washington
Constitution to determine if the rigidity of the court's position is
justified by the document's purpose and history. To read the
language of the constitution without regard to the context in
which it was written and to fail to consider the possibility that
changing contexts should change the reading, would be inconsis-
tent with modern perceptions of appellate court jurisprudence.
Therefore, if a contemporary analysis should reveal that the val-
ues associated with the particular language have changed, one
should entertain the possibility that the interpretation must
change to accommodate modern conditions.
As sections V and VI of this Article demonstrate, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court has realistically appraised the restrictive
religious freedom clause in the Washington State Constitution
William Sampson (1764-1836) was the distinguished New York attorney who acted
as amicus curiae and partial defense counsel for Fr. Anthony Kohlmann, S.J., in the
landmark priest-penitent case in New York. Sampson was a Protestant. His vigorous
invectives against the ossification of the common law helped bring about much-needed
reforms in New York State.
The opinion of William Sampson was made available through the kind offices of
Rev. Arthur L. Valade, Assistant Chancellor of the Archdiocese of Detroit. We are very
much indebted to Mr. Howard Benard Gotlieb, Archivist, Sterling Library, Yale Univer-
sity, for his patient and timely assistance in deciphering Mr. Sampson's writing.
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and in the process has moved beyond the social views incorpo-
rated in that document. In this context, it had no choice, as the
possible intrusion of the state into religious practices would be
barred by contemporary attitudes of the United States Supreme
Court on free exercise issues.
The court has not been forced to do so in the establishment
clause area, for it has not yet been challenged on a restrictive
interpretation of federal equal protection or free exercise,
although the court had noted that possibility as "[tihe only pos-
sibile qualification upon the sweeping prohibition of Const. art.
9, § 4."18 Yet, given the exploration of the contemporary atti-
tudes that formed the basis for the language found in the Wash-
ington State Constitution, it is suggested in this Article that the
court re-examine its historic attitude towards the impermeabil-
ity of the wall allegedly separating church and state.
Such an approach entails political risks. Admittedly, for
some members of the body politic, any change in the orthodox
mandate of absolute separation would indeed be the end of civi-
lization as we know it. Other citizens are more comfortable with
the thought that the sun will probably continue to rise in the
morning, even if a few more children are riding buses or getting
free textbooks. But such calm persuasiveness may not prevail
against the residue of bigotry that lies just below the surface of
civic politeness.
In a calmer atmosphere, the Washington Supreme Court
recently recanted its long-held views on the somewhat related
topic of loaning public money or credit to private individuals. 8 '
One reason for denying funds to students attending church-
related institutions has now apparently been completely
eroded. 88 This reversal of a long-cherished "strict attitude"
about the use of public funds entails a new realism and supports
the view that no textual reason exists to prevent re-examination
of the constitutional language prohibiting aid to schools under
sectarian influence. The most recent aid-to-higher-education-
students case decided by the Washington court shows no incli-
186. Weiss v. Bruno, 82 Wash. 2d 199, 206 n.2, 509 P.2d 973, 978 n.2 (1973).
187. See Washington State Housing Fin. Comm'n v. O'Brien, 100 Wash. 2d 491, 671
P.2d 247 (1983).
188. In Higher Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Graham, 84 Wash. 2d 813, 529 P.2d 1051
(1974), the court had argued that one reason for denying loans to students attending
church-related schools was the "no loan of credit" provisions reinterpreted in Washing-
ton State Housing Fin. Comm'n v. O'Brien, 100 Wash. 2d 491, 671 P.2d (1983).
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nation of the majority to do so."'
Even the compact provision's meaning190 might be reread
without the consent of Congress because the interpretation of
constitutional language is ultimately a judicial, not a legislative
function. In addition, any reliance upon the "compact provision"
in the Washington State Constitution may be faulty for an
entirely different reason related to the constitutional propriety
of congressional demands for a Blaine amendment.
The Blaine amendment language, contained in what is now
amendment 34 and article IX, section 4 of the state constitution,
was inserted as the price of admission to the Union. Can Con-
gress exact such a price? The United States Constitution pro-
vides that: "New states may be admitted by the Congress into
this Union." 191 While this language suggests untrammeled con-
gressional power to make the grant of statehood conditional, the
United States Supreme Court has not so construed it. Instead,
the Court has repeatedly stated that "[e]quality of constitu-
tional right and power is the condition of all the States of the
Union, old and new. ' 192 Thus, it might well be argued that the
imposition of conditions limiting state choices regarding church-
state relations or the regulation of private, religiously motivated
behavior denied the equality of the petitioning territories and
was therefore an act beyond the power of Congress, especially
since at the time the other states were not yet bound to the first
amendment. 193
Perhaps the strongest statement and best discussion of the
principle of equality among the states may be found in Pollard
v. Hagan.94 In Pollard, the Court held that because the original
thirteen states had reserved to themselves the ownership of the
beds of navigable streams, the principle of equality among the
states requires that title to the beds of all navigable streams
pass to a new state upon admission.195 A case more directly on
point is Coyle v. Smith,'98 in which the Court held unconstitu-
tional a provision in the Oklahoma Enabling Act that required
189. Witters v. Commission for the Blind, 102 Wash. 2d 624, 689 P.2d 53 (1984).
190. WASH. CONST. art. XXVI.
191. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
192. E.g., Escanabe Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 689 (1882).
193. The first amendment religion clauses were not held applicable to the states
until after World War II.
194. 44 U.S. (2 How.) 212, 230 (1845).
195. Id.
196. 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
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the state capital to be located at Guthrie. The rationale in the
Coyle decision was that Congress may not include in an enabling
act restrictions upon matters that are sovereign attributes and
under state control. In dictum, the Court stated that:
The Constitutional provision concerning the admission of
new states is not a mandate, but a power to be exercised with
discretion. From this alone it would follow that Congress may
require, under penalty of denying admission, that the organic
laws of a new State at the time of admission shall be such as to
meet its approval. A constitution thus supervised by Congress
would, after all, be a constitution of a State, and as such sub-
ject to alteration and amendment by the State after admission.
Its force would be that of a state constitution, and not that of
an act of Congress. 97
This dictum and the thrust of other decisions suggest that
the provision in the enabling act for Washington,198 which
requires the consent of Congress before Washington constitu-
tional provisions regarding church-state issues may be changed,
is void because it both restricts the state's exercise of the police
power, an attribute of sovereignty, and attempts to place the
"deadhand" of Congress on the state's constitution-making pro-
cess. Moreover, a close reading of Coyle suggests that the consti-
tutional conditions or provisions that Congress may demand are
those relating to a "republican form of government" and not
greater restrictions unrelated to Congress' express powers.199
Finally, historical evidence suggests that conditions were
extracted to promote anti-Catholic and anti-Mormon ideology.
Thus, even though a legislative act is facially neutral in its
impact, if its purpose and effect are to disadvantage discrete
minorities, it fails to grant equal protection of the law. 00
Taken together, such principles suggest that the Washing-
ton court could change its position on the meaning of the anti-
establishment clauses in the state constitution. Should a new
legislature attempt again to aid private church-related endeav-
ors, be they educational or social-service oriented, this Article
suggests that the court need not use the language of the state
constitution to defeat the will of the people.
197. Id. at 568.
198. See Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676 (1889).
199. 221 U.S. at 574-75.
200. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 390-91 (1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 369, 380-81 (1967).
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